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INTRODUCTION
 
Through linguistic knowledge, the world as seen from
 
the diverse viewpoints of other social groups, tlat we
 
have thought of as alien, becoities intelligible ijn hew
 
terms. Alienness turns into a ne|w and often darifying
 
way of looking at things.
 
Benjamin Whorf, "Language, Mind and Reality"
 
Ever since Benjamin Whoff first proposed what isi now 
known as the theory of linguistic relativity, scholars have 
debated how much influence, if any, language has on a 
person's perceptions of "reality." Early in his studies of 
different dialects and languages, Whorf became conviiiced 
that individual conscibusness was closely related to, and 
even determined by, one's language. He linked this 
assertioh to his understanding of the workings of thoi 
processes, and strove throughout his Writings to demonstrate 
the interconnection between thought and language. This is 
seen most clearly in his essay, "Language. Mind, and | 
Reality": ■ 
Actually, thinking is most mysterious, and by faf: the
 
greatest light shed upon it that we have is thrown by
 
the study of language. This study shows that the forms
 
of a person's thbughts are controlied by inexorcifole
 
laws of pattern of which he [or stie] is unconscious.
 
These patterns are the unperceived intricate
 
systematizations of his [or her] own language .
 
Thinking is itself in a language (252)
 
■ ■ ■ ' ■ .. . 
In this passage^ Whorf aisserts not only the
 
interrelation of thought and language, but further, jttie 
, ■ ii 
dependency of thought on language, and the dependency of 
>■ ■ . ^ ' ■ I 
both thought and language on "intricate pattern systems" 
within the human mind. In most of his writings, Whorlf 
asserts that language acts as the catalyst for both the 
genesis and conseguent Construction of these patterns; within 
the human mind. In essence, Whorf claims that different 
languages actually form different patterns in speaker's* 
minds^ which, in turn, influence and even "control" the ways 
in which reality is perceived by individuals within eu 
culture. This notion that an individual's perception of 
"reality," or in other words, a person 's "consciousness," is 
controlled by the language he or she uses, is referred to as 
"linguistic determinism." Whorf's strongest assertion 
regarding linguistic determinism is Shown in the follbwing 
passage from "Language, Mind, and Reality": 
Every language is a vast pattern-system, differeWt from 
others, in which hre cuiturallyordained forms a;nd 
categories by which the personality not only 
communicates, but also analyzes nature, notices or 
neglects types of relationship and phenomena, chknnels 
his [or her] reasoning, and build5 the house of lis [or 
her] consciousness. (252) 
What is especially interesting in this assertion IS 
Whorf's claim that language^ as a vast pattern-system 
formulates the ways in which humans cc:mmunicate, and even
 
more essentially, the ways in which hu|:mans analyze the world
 
around them. By forming patterns and
 
relationships from among the multitudinous phenomena
 
encountered at any given moment> the human mind begins the V
 
construction of "knowledge." This knowledge, or "wha can
 
be known" is not limited to knowledge of the externa1 world,
 
but perhaps even more importantly, it is also the way in
 
which humans begin to "know" themselVes: it is the
 
beginning of the construction of consciousness of botjh the
 
"self" and Of "others." Moreover, from Whorfs perspective,
 
language is the shared symbolic system through which lumans
 
not only communicate with those who sh.are their langiiage
 
(and possibly their "world view"), but it is also the
 
mechanism for thinking the most personal and private ;
 
thoughts. Therefore, in Whorfian term|is, language is the
 
primary construct for both individual and collective
 
consciousnesses.
 
Recently, however, the strong version of Whorf's
 
of linguistic relativism has been challenged by many
 
contemporary linguists and language theorists (e.g., Slobin,
 
1974, Friedrich, 1986), because of its inherent determinism.
 
Many of these theorists have now refined Whorf's initial
 
theory of linguistic determinism to a "weaker" version of
 
linguistic relativism. Rather than profess that language
 
determines thought, these theorists maintain that
 
 . . . certain aspects of language can predispose people
 
to think or act in one way rathei' than another, 1 but
 
there is no rigid determinisin:One is hot fully a
 
prisoner of one's language; it is; just a guide t
 
thought and other sorts of behavior. (Slobin 122)
 
Although most linguists hold to t;his "weak" theory of
 
linguistic relativism rather than Whorf's "strong,"
 
deterministic version, I do take exception to Slobin s use
 
of the word "just" in reference to language's role of
 
guiding "thought and other sorts of bsshavior." If language
 
does indeed act as a guide to thought, then it may be quite
 
dangerous to underplay this relationship with a quali:fier
 
(e.g.,"just") of any sort. This is particularly true when
 
analyzing the role that language plays in constructirig
 
social awareness and individual consci.ousness, as Matgaret
 
Atwood demonstrates throughout The Handmaid's Tale.
 
However, because language both influences and i^
 
influenced by both the "self" and others, which in tiiirn
 
influence one another, it is necessary to examine the
 
contexts within which language grows cind evolves. By
 
examining the social, psychological, eind political contexts
 
of language, we can more clearly see what influence 1anguage
 
has on both society and on individuals. These contexts of
 
language are vital to meaning-making in the real world, and
 
as will be shown, are vital to meaning-making in the novel.
 
Twice in The Handmaid's Tale the narrator states, "Context
 
 is all." Playing on Hamlet's line, "Readiness is all," and
 
again on Lear's line, "Ripeness is all," Atwood focuses the
 
reader's attention on the significance not only of the- line
 
itself, but on the idea that we cannot understand (or "make
 
sense of") any situation without first comprehending the
 
context within which it occurred. This phrase resonates
 
with meaning, and is essential in understanding the
 
construction of the novel (as Chapter 4 wi11 i1lustra;
 
'
 
but even more importantly, it is vital to understanding the
 
construction of the narrator's self.
 
The narrator, known only by the p|atronymic Offred, has
 
in a sense been de-contextualized with her immersion into
 
the dystopic and highly authoritarian regime of Gileai;d. The
 
only way she can survive within this unfamiliar and
 
dangerous culture is to strive to forget her past and
 
"reconstruct" or re-encultrate herself. She soon learns,
 
however, that t^e religious, political ical
 
contexts of this new society impose strict limitations on
 
the ways in which she can construct hejrself. What ties all
 
of these contexts together, and is at the center of t.he
 
novel, is language. And it is language that brings iis the
 
narrative, acts as the major force in both the
 
deconstruction and the reconstruction of Offred's "sielf,"
 
and solidifies the social structure in Gilead, even though,
 
paradoxically, language is the most highly guarded commodity
 
in this futuristic society.
 
■ I 
  
In this thesis, I will explore the various conte;xts of 
language, specifically the socio/pOlitical contexts o'f 
language, which act as the constructs of both individ)aal 
■ . . ... .. ; ■ j 
"selves" and of whole cominunities. In most discussiofIS of 
constructiyism, the constant tensioh between the indiv^idual 
and the group is set up as a polarity one in which t;lie self 
and "others" are in constant struggle for supremacy o|e the 
ihdividua1 cpnsciousne:Ss. However, as this thesis wi;LI 
deiiionstrate, this tension between self and others is 'Lh fact 
the chief catalyst which enables Offred to ire-construct her 
own consciousness while at the same tiine re-encultrat (or 
re-socialize) herself within this foreign and hostilei 
environment. In both endeavors, Offred's primary too;L is 
language. Because language is the chief means by wh:L 
humans communicate, and through communication make sense of 
■' ; '■ . , . ■ ■ ■ ^ ■] 
their world and those around them, she relies on both] her 
past, familiar language (connotative in nature and i 
figurative in meaning) and her present, limited langiiaige 
(denotative in nature and literal in meaning) to 
re-organize, talk about, and finally "know" both the new 
regime in Gilead and most importantly, her new self i;n . ■ ' 
relation to that community. 
Chapter 1, "Deconstruction: The Loss of the Serf" will 
examine the ways in which language is used to both : 
deconstruct the old society and also to reconstruct a; new 
society. The focus will be primarily on the pplitics of 
  
 
language, and the ways in which those in power shape
 
people's perceptions through limiting access to both written
 
arid oral speech and also through the 1inguistic acts of
 
naming and labeling;
 
Chapter 2, "Reconstruction and Renewal," focvises
 
primarily on Offred's attempts to reco:nstruct herself within
 
this new society. It further explores the implicatioIS of
 
linguistic relativity and the interconsections betweei ,
 
language, thought, and the constructio'n of the self. Also,
 
it will describe and analyze the proce3S whereby Offr ad : . '-v'
 
comes to understand her new society, how she uses inn it
 
language as a mediator between the sel imposed on he:-by
 
the new regime and the self that she onee was, and the ways
 
in which language acts to construct he corisciousness anew;
 
Chapter 3, "Ambiguity, Uncertainty, and the Quest for
 
Freedom," explores the possibilities a/^aliable with multiple
 
interpretations. Furthermore, it explo:res the relationship
 
between writer and reader and and how the two might interact
 
in an effort to make meaning.
 
Chapter 4, "Contextual Construct'.s and ConstrailIts,"
 
explores the last section of The Handmaid's Tale, an
 
"epilogue" erititled "Histprical Notes on THE HANDMAID'
 
TALE," with specific empihasis on the Wclys in which context
 
affects meaning in communication; Thi^ chapter represents
 
an effort to demonstrate (in Atwood's words) that context.
 
indeed, is all.
 
CHAPTER 1
 
DECONSTRUCTION; THE LOSS 0F THE SELF
 
What is commonly referred to as culture . . . is! no
 
more than the official ideology of those in power.
 
Robert St. Glair, "The Politics of Language"
 
Definition, the creation of categories—these are
 
useful and necessary, but they are also dangerdus. . .
 
If they become staightjackets, restricting and ;
 
confining, they are destructive; they have become false
 
naming. True naming is a process of infinite grpwth,
 
infinite flexibility.
 
Karen Lindssy. Friends as Familv
 
Imagine being torn from a familiar culture—alienated
 
from family, friends, and community-^and being forcec into
 
an unfamiliar and hostile e^nvironment. ?e-,
 
where all the rules have changed—the •rules" of which most
 
of us are not even conscidusly aware; rules governing both
 
verbal and non-verbal communication, rililes regarding ays of
 
dressing, ways of actihg, ways of knowing, ways of being.
 
How would we act? How would we "learn" the new rules How
 
would we make sense of our new world? How would we si.rvive?
 
Margaret Atwood's noyel. The Handmaid's Tale, not onlv
 
formulates these questions, but in doing so, strikes at the
 
very core of what developmental psychologists, language
 
theorists, and philosophers have strugcfled with for
 
centuries: How is meaning made? To e>plore this question,
 
Atwood sets her dystopian novel in the futuristic setting of
 
Gilead,: within which a fanatical and fundamentalist
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 Christian regime has violently and quickly overthrown' the 
U.S. government and seized control. A|twood immerses
 ler 
central character within the hostile, oppressive, and
 
, ■ ■ ■ ■ ■! 
unfamiliar environment of Gilead, and in doing so, explores 
the ways in which an individual must re-learn the rulps 
governing speech, thought and action in order to make sense 
of a foreign environment. In this respect, the making of 
meaning becomes the primary activity of the central 
character and narrator. Offred, as she strives to survive in 
and make sense of her new world. 
This meaning-making activity is clearly defined by 
developmental psychologist Robert Kegan in The Evolving 
Self; 
Seen psychologically, this procesi is about the 
development of "knowing"; but at the same time, w 
experience this activity. . .1 use the word "meaning" 
to refer to this simultaneously ejiistemblogical and 
ontological activity; it is about knowing and being, 
about theory-making and investment^s and commitments of 
the self. (Kegan 45) 
In this sense, the making of meaning involves ways of 
"knowing," primarily the types of "knowledge" that are 
sanctioned by an individual's community (or society or; 
culture) which establishes the nature, criteria and validity 
of "what can be known." Cognitively, meaning-iiiaking 
involves the growth and development of cognitive schemes. 
through which individuals "pattern" information. These
 
cognitive patterns (or Schemes) then serve to form
 
connections and establish relations between "old
 
information" ah "new information." Moreover, the making of
 
meaning also encompasses "ways of being"—whether or not an
 
individual accepts current paradigms formed by the coiTmiunity
 
or society to which he or she holds me:|mbership Of whether,
 
instead, the individual fprmuiates new ways of making
 
meaning. The ways in which an ihdividual mak^ of the
 
world, or comes to understand a^^^ "khow" it, are highp-y
 
indioative of an individual's ways of being, in the j
 
existential, rather than essential, seuse of "being."|
 
Therefore, this meahing^making activitj/ involves not only
 
assimilating information, but making cioiceS about what the
 
information "means." Furthermore, mea:ling-making is an
 
experience (or activity) through which we dome to knpV both
 
ourselves and our world. It iS not a static, theoretica1
 
construct. Rather, it is an active, o:
 -going process| at
 
the heart of which are the symbols of anguage. This||
 
meaning^making activity is central to thought and
 
Jf­consciousness and, as Walker Percy con-■inuaily reminds us, 
it is a uniquely human actiyity (Sianobsts 123). 
Throughout The Handmaid's Tale. O fred shows thaf: 
creating meaning (or "making" sense) o her new world 1 IS an 
active process which involves the recojiceptualization' of 
"reality" and the consequent process o forgetting hei 
■■ 10 
  
in order to survive in the present^ It is Offred's
 
meaning-making activity which forms the basis of the
 
narrative construction of the novel, and also vividly
 
illustrates the role that language pla|ys in constructing a
 
new society while simuitaneously deconstructing the old. If
 
is a story about the deconstruction and subsequent
 
reconstruction Of one woman's Conscioushess in the midst of
 
a hostile, confusing, and inherently "self"-alienatinig
 
socio-political environment.
 
The new government in Gilead is aole to redefine
 
culture, construct a new society, and impose its world view
 
on the populace through placing strihgsnt controls on
 
language. Permeated by a fear of individuals thinking for
 
themselves and staging a revolt, those in power ban t:ie use
 
of interpersonal communication and deprive all but thb most
 
powerful access to reading and writing These stringent
 
controls on language represent the government's attempt to
 
turn people into "objects"; through the loss of
 
subjectivity, a11 become "others." They are aliens in an
 
unfamiliar environment. They must, theh, not only learn the
 
"rules" underlying both the culture and the language,!? they
 
must also re-encultrate (or resocializ )^ themselves. This
 
chapter will explore the ways in which those in poweriimpose
 
their oppressive ideology on the populace and attempt to
 
limit the proliferation of meaning, to mark bpuhdaries
 
between members of society through labhling, and to strip
 
11
 
  
 
language of emotion arid feeling by stressing literal Irather
 
than non-literal (or metaphorical) meaning.
 
The Gileadean government is patriarchal in the extreme
 
and because of its radical, right-wing religious ideo"
 
believes that it is constructing a sbciety "sanctione|d" by
 
Biblical precedent. Most of its "rules" have what thkDse in
 
power consider to be Scriptural preGedent. The most bbvious
 
of these "rules" is the conscription of a Handmaiden to a
 
Commander for the purpose of childbearing. This practice
 
finds its roots—and what the Gileadean government purports
 
to be its justification—^in Genesis 30: 1-3, the passage
 
which is the source for one of the riovsi's epigraphs:; "And
 
when Rachel saw that she bare Jacob no chiIdren, Rachfa1
 
envied her sister; and said unto Jacob, Give me children, or
 
else I die. . . . And she said, Behold my maid Bilhal.. She
 
.': * ' ■■ ■ ,! ■ ■ 
shall bear upon my knees, that I may aLso have children by
 
her." However, consigning and erislavi:ig women as handmaids,
 
for purposes of bearing children for the upper echelon^ is
 
not the only practice—or laiw—which gains its purported
 
authority from Scriptural precedence. Others include the
 
silencing of women (found in Paul's le:ter to the
 
Corinthians), the sovereignty and suprkmacy of males 
i
 
(Genesis, particularly, but also throughout Paul's lei:ters),
 
and many other Laws derived from both Old and New Tesl:ament
 
texts.
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 One of the first things the goverinment does to
 
implement its radical ideology is to d;ivide, classify, ancj
 
label women according to social rank aind status. Ttie
 
labeling system that the government im|iplemehts demarjcates
 
boundaries between men and wpmen, and further, betwe|e'i
 
various "classes" of women. There are flye distinct
 
"classes" of women in Gilead: the Wive s who are marpr Led to
 
high ranking and powerful Commanders atnd other top mi:
 
officers; the Aunts who have some acces s to the writ|ten
 
Word; the Marthas who are the servants of the Wives and are
 
in charge of domestic responsibilities;j the Econowivjes who
 
are married to the working classes and are incapable: of
 
reproduction due to genetic mutations stemming from Exposure
 
to nuclear and other ehvironmental wastes; and the
 
Handmaids, who have proven their reproductive capabil;i.ties
 
in the past, and whose bodies have been consigned toithe
 
service of reproducing children for the members of the
 
' - . ■ ' ' ' ■ ' - . ■ j". , ' 
high-ranking, white officials of the new regime. A ieist 
category (actually a "sub-category") of women are laJDi-iled 
"Unwomen." This category consists of Handmaids who 
failed to reproduce after three one-year assignmentsiwith 
three different Commanders, some lesbieins (referred tci in 
the novel as "gender traitors"), and nuns who will not 
recant their vows and their allegiance to the Roman Gatholic 
Church. These women are sent to "The (j^olonies," a e of 
labor camp where they clean up nuclear waste, with thei 
13
 
consequehces of prolonged and unprotected exposure to
 
radiation, leading to severe illness, disease, and
 
ultimately death.
 
Although the classification system used in the novel
 
may seem extreme because of its blatant tendency to devalue
 
people, it is not as foreign as it applears. Nearly all
 
societies have some system which categbrizes, classifies,
 
and separates people into classes or castes. Some examples
 
of social labels are the "Untouchables'• of India (similar in
 
social status and duty to the Unwomen bf Gilead), or even
 
closer to home, the "savages" and "heai:hens" of 17th and
 
18th century America. Although the practice of labeljng IS
 
generally derogatory and prejudicial, it is also probably
 
the most common method whereby humans denote the
 
similarities or differences between people within soci.ety.
 
Labeling is equivalent to the Piagetian concept of
 
classification, a cognitive process whcsreby a person, when
 
shown a group of different items, focusies on a single
 
characteristic or trait and then group^ the items accci]rding
 
to that single characteristic or trait (Woolfolk 61).
 
Although classification is a natural, and importarnt.
 
developmental stage in cognition, when used to "groups
 
people" through labeling—especially according to a singular
 
trait or characteristic-^^it can easily become a means cot
 
oppression and devaluation. By their very nature, labels
 
prevent alternatives in the process of classification.
 in
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"Linguistic Factors in Prejudice," Gordon Allport states
 
that "every label applied to a given person refers properly
 
only to one aspect pf his [or her] nature" (108). T3iis'^-is;
 
particularly true When the label is meant to stand for the
 
person-as-entity; in other words, when the label acts as the
 
primary indication of a person'sstatus, occupation, and
 
identity in his or her society. Allport refers to tliese
 
labels as "labels of primary potency" because they call
 
attention to what society has deemed tle primary trait of an
 
individual, while overlooking all other traits. Gordon
 
states that labels of primary potency ••act as shriekiig
 
sirens, deafening us to all finer discriminations thcr; we
 
might otherwise perceive" (108). Ofte::n, labels of primary
 
potency limit the possible ways that a person can be
 
perceived by society, and maty possibly limit self-peroeptiori
 
as well. Labels of primary potency ari one of the ways in
 
which self-concept is established. Therefore, the labeling
 
system used in Gilead serves a dua1 pu;rpose: It divides,
 
categorizes, and classifies people acc<[)rdirig to socia rank
 
and duty while it simultaneously places limitations on the
 
ways in which people are perceived by other members of
 
society and also by themselves.
 
In a society like Gilead, where the covert yet implicit
 
goal is to dehumanize people, devaluat;.on through labeling
 
is an effective means to this end. Through bringing our
 
attention to this blatant (although often overlooked) form
 
15
 
 of oppression, Atwood allows us to takle a closer looki at
 
Gorisciously—dQ
what we commonly—although possibly unc hsciously' o! with
 
language, specifically the act of labeling, in our bw:n
 
society. What Atwood also brings to the reader's att sntion,
 
however, are the ways that society's perceptions of
 
"reality" are transformed through the use of labels,
 
long cla
Linguistically speaking, all labels be to the ss of
 
nouns, the element of language which "hameS" things.
 
Through the use of nouns (names) we classify our
 
surroundings. However, as Allport poipts out, the hukan
 
capacity and act of naming brings with it a parallel ? hange
 
in the way reality is perceived:
 
To state the matter technically, k noun abstract from
 
a concrete reality some one feature and assemble
 
different concrete realities only with respect ) this
 
one feature . . . Thus each label we use, especially
 
those of primary potency> distracts our attention from
 
concrete reality. The living, breathing complex
 
individual—the ultimate unit of human nature—is lost
 
to sight. (108)
 
In this passage, Allport identifies an essential paradox 
involved in the act of "naming": although classifying the 
world through use of nouns (through "neiming" things) is .. 
essential for humans to begin to make sense of the worId,:- ■ 
nouns also haye the capacity for simpli.fying complex aspects 
of the world and individuals within the world. We name what 
16
 
we know, but does the name allow us to look beyond the 
single feature amplified by the name (noun) itself? Or does 
it, instead, simplify our conceptualization of that which is 
named, allowing us only to perceive a single aspect pf the 
"concrete reality" rather than the alternate, complek 
"realities" beyond the name? Although naming is necessary 
for cognitive organization and patterning (which in turn 
produce cognitive development), naming may also limit the 
possible alternative ways in which "that which is namfed" can 
be perceived or "known."
 
■Through the use of labels. Specif{Lically in the act of 
re-naming and labeling women, the powe structure in Gilead 
imposes a system which is not only discriminatory, bul, which 
acts to demote people to the status of an object. People 
lose their complexity; the labeling system simplifies what 
was once a "living, breathing, complex human being," and 
masking all other attributes of humann t^ss, categorizeis them 
according to their obligation to the State. Handmaids are 
no longer women; instead, their label designates their 
societal function, and limits all otheit' attributes. Ciffred 
■■ ' . H' 'recognizes this when she states, "We aife for breeding 
purposes . . . We are two-legged wombs that's all; jsacred 
vessels, ambulatory chalices" (176). i$he, like the oliher 
Handmaids, has lost her individuality nd has, instead, been 
subsumed under a "category" known by it;s label. (Also 
noteworthy in this passage is Offred•s use of Scriptural" 
17 
 discourse, the words "sacred vessels" and "chalices." Not
 
only has she lost her sense of Individuality and identity,
 
she has also acquired the "language" of the regime and uses
 
it to define herself and her social funotion.)
 
Through language, Specifically in the act of renaming
 
and labeling, those in power in Gilead begin solidifying the
 
construction of a new world order. This is not a
 
revolutionary idea; rather, what Atwood has done in the
 
novel (with the emphasis on renaming) is to illustrate the
 
fundamental human capacity to "name what is known;" pir, from
 
a Whorfian perspective, to "know" only that which is
 
"named." It is, as Whorf states, the way that humam use
 
the "strange gift of language to Weaive the web of Maya or
 
illusion, to make a provisional analysis of reality and then
 
regard it as final" (Language; Thought^ and Realitv 263Y.
 
Naming weaves the web of illusion because through haming
 
things, people have the tendency to believe that the name in
 
fact is the entity; we may forget that words are symbb1ic
 
tools which help us to converse and communicate about:
 
"reality" and the world in which we live. Furthermore5, this
 
act of naming is more of a social act than an individual
 
act; it is an agreement between individuals, in the form of
 
language, as to how "reality" or the external world w;Lll be
 
perceived. It is the way we make sense of our world.
 
Because the Gileadean ideology is foreign to the se
 
trapped within its walls, the inhabitants must rely on the
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 new naming system to make sense of it. are 
indoctrinated into the new culture, and they begin to learn 
the rules governing the new culture through their limited 
exposure to language. They pay attention to names ani ■ 
labels. In Gilead, then, naming becomes a particularLy 
effective way to begin defining the new environment, shaping 
the political realm, and identifying (i labeling) people with 
their social roles. Offred soon realizes, however, tlat the 
rules governing language, primarily the act of "naming," 
have changed. In every culture, personal names are Sfbrongly 
linked to an individual's identity. Often, names are 
"commonly associated with the physical and moral 
characteristics of their bearers . . . [and] they are 
treated as bonds between an individual and the group" (Bram 
41). However, in Gilead, names which denote individuality 
are banned. Names of people and thing3 no longer conyey 
identity; rather, names denote social tatus, rank, and 
duty. Offred, like the other Handmaiis, is given a 
patronymic, made of the possessive "of" attached to the 
Commander to whom her reproductive capabilities have been 
designated. Since she is consigned to a high ranking 
officer named Fred, her new name is Offred. She has been 
renamed and her name means, literally, "the property of 
Fred." In this transition, she not on Ly loses a sense of 
-«f- II •
identity, she also loses a sense of hexself as" e<:
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 because she is deemecJ "property," she becomes objectified in
 
the most extreme and devaluative sense of the word.
 
with the los^ of her proper name and thrbugh thb
 
subsequent renaming process, the society explicitly j
 
proclaims that a woman (particularly a Handmaid) belo;ngs not
 
to herself but to ahother. Offred tries to accept this'"'
 
transition, for the sake of survival, but she never is able
 
to forget the strong borid between her past name and lb'
er
 
identity, as shown in the following passage: i
 
My name isn't Offred, I have another name, which nobody
 
uses now because it's forbidden, I tell myself it
 
doesn't matter, your name is like youf telephondsj
 
number, useful only to others; but what I tell in:
 
is wrong, it does matter. (108)
 
Names do matter, not only in her past life, but even )tiore,
 
in the present. But in Gilead, she is no longer nameii; she
 
is labeled and with that label comes a Loss of
 
self. She reveals this loss of self—not only her id:
 
but the power and freedom of self-definition—in the ;Lines,
 
"I feel transparent . . . I feel as if there's not mui::h left
 
of me . . . as if I'm made of smoke, as if i'm a mirage"
 
(110). With the loss of her name, a 1OSS of identity, and a
 
loss of personal freedom, she seems to begin to fade into
 
nothingness.
 
As inhumane as these language abuses are, however, the
 
practice of renaming in Gilead goes far beyond changing
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 personal names and labelihg. Because speech is so cl|Osely
 
related to thought, and particularly because knowledg|e is
 
proliferated through the written word, the Gileadean
 
government is quite threatened by lahguage's accessibiility
 
If people have access to language, it is assumed, they also
 
have access to an unlimited array of ideas—-to knowledge and
 
thought—'and thinking "subjects" are more likely to stage a
 
revolt than unthinking "objects." Therefore, the worjd is
 
highly guarded; no one but the most pojwerful have acc|ess to
 
the written word. In this manner, peopie are truly
 
alienated; they are alienated from others, isolated wafchin
 
the world of their own minds , one of the c|lief
 
means of bridging the gap between self and others—
 
"commune"-ication in the most literal jsense—-is no lo'iiger
 
accessible to anyone but the most powerful.
 
The inaccessibility of language i:n Gilead is esp^
 
apparent in the Commander•s ritualized reading from the
 
Bible before The Ceremony. In this scene. Offred informs us
 
that, "The Bible is kept locked up. . . It is an ihcei
 
device: who knows what we'd make of it, if we ever gbt our
 
hands on it?" (112). In Gilead, The Word (not only tiie
 
Scriptures, but all language) is guarded. Those in power,
 
those who make the rules, know the pow<2f of language iand
 
fear its allusiveness. They fear the proliferation c:
 
meaning. This is best illustrated in Offred's statement,
 
"We can be read to from it, by him, but we Gannpt read''
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(112). The Word has a single interpretation in Gileac
 
which is professed as the "literal" interpretation, jut',
 
which is really only the interpretation of those in pcower.
 
Offred soon realizes that the source of the Commander'
|''s
 
power is language, evidenced in her line, "He has som€ething
 
we don't have, he has the word" (114). The Commanderi
 not
 
only "has the word," but also has the power of
 
interpretation—of choosing and assigning meaning to
 
words—and because of this he has choice, he has freedom, he
 
has power.
 
One of the most serious ramifications of being denied
 
access to the word, as Offred soon fing:s> is that when words
 
are misused, or phrases misquoted or e/en fabricated, she
 
and the others have no way of "proving the deception
 
There is no way to cross reference: th<^se in power cap
 
construct a society through fabricated Biblical references,
 
and can incorpGrate laws which purport to have Scriptural
 
precedents, and no one can argue with them. One example of
 
this type of blatant deception occurs at the Center where
 
the Handmaids were first indoctrinated
 into the new culture.
 
Offred remembers that a tape recording of the Beatitudes was
 
played every day, tape recorded by amale, Offred tells us,
 
so that "even the Aunts wouldn't be gu
iIty of the sin of
 
reading" (114). One which struck her s particularly odd
 
and didn't "sound right" was "Blessed re the silent."
 
This, of course, is not found in the Sc
:riptures; it iss a
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command that was to be imposed on the women, but bhiyl under
 
the guise of Scriptural authority/ Offred knows thiisl, but
 
has ho way of proving it. She says, "I knew they madis that
 
up, I knew it was wrong, and they left things out, too, but
 
there was no way of checking" (115). The lack of acc|ess to
 
the word—both printed and spoken—equals a lack of power in
 
Gilead. It also equates to a lack of thought, and a
 
resultant lack of "self."
 
Control of language, then, becomes control of the way
 
the individual views the world and the way in which society
 
is constructed. Because Offred*s language is limited;, her
 
world view is limited, and in a surprisingly short time
 
(as Offred says, "It has taken us so 1ittle time to change
 
our minds" [38]) she has begun the probess^ of \; I
 
re-contextualization, or re-socialization. In order to
 
survive within this culture. Offred has learned that she
 
must somehow learn, if not accept, the official ideolc)gy of
 
the culture. Wheira the official ideoli>i•gy and the lane uage
 
of the culture merge is in the imposition of the offiiial
 
ideology on society. In The Social and
 
Contexts of Language, Robert St. Clair suggests that 1: he
 
ideology of a culture is generally imposed by those in power
 
through linguistic manipulatibh such as "labeling oth rs as
 
deviant, legitimizing the knowledge of those in power
 
and establishing barriers to social mobdility through
 
language" (27). As has been shown pre v^iously, Gilead.
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imposes its ideology in all of these ways: through 1
 
and renaming, through legitimizing the knowledge of tlose in
 
power by allowing only the powerful access to reading
 and
 
writing (hence knowledge-making)> and through restrie
ting
 
the use of language among the inhabitants which resul ts.' in O\/',
 
their alienation from others and in stifling what the can
 
know about society and about themselve
. Their ppsit

-on and
 
rank in society are static and chances for social mob
 lity
 
are nil.
 
The power structure in Gilead doei not stop at
 
labeling, renaming, and iimiting communication, however. In
 
their attempt to construct a new socieby, those in poyer in
 
Gilead have either renamed or "un"-hamled locations ariq
 
events as well as peoplei This is shown most nbticea]ii)ly
 
when Offred notices that the name of a clothing store has
 
been painted over. She remembers that the store (a shop
 
where the Handmaids order their dresses:

, or "habits") was
 
once named "Lilies of the Field." Sincije the name was
 
obiiterated, it is now only known by i
ts huge wooden sign in
 
the shape of a lily. Offred responds o this further
 
restriction of language by stating, "[T]hey decided that
 
even the names of shops were too much
 temptation for us.
 
Now places are known by their signs alene" (33). Plades, as
 
well as people, have been demoted to
 e status of a sign,
 
Words are outlawed because with the wri a
tten word comes' 
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growth in thought and in consciousness, both of whichl are
 
feared by the powerful in Gilead.
 
Another instance of renaming is seen when Offred and
 
her shopping companion, another Handmaid named Ofglen walk
 
along the street to do their daily, ritiia1ized shopping.
 
They come to the store called "Loaves and Fishes" whi"h is
 
marked (denoted) by a "wooden sign, a fish with a smiLe and
 
eyelashes." Offred states that she is lured to the szore by
 
"the picture of succulent white fillets in the window'
 
(213). The sign serves more than one purpose, hoWevet. it
 
is not only in the window to "lure" customers to the store;
 
it also serves to indicate whether or not the items (in this
 
case, the fillets) are in stock. As 0ffred explains, "They
 
put the picture in the window when they have something, take
 
it away when they don't. Sign language" (213). OffrM'S
 
reference to "sign" language here is more than a on
 
words, Rather, it is a strong indication of Gilead's
 
regression from a mode of communicatind through symbo:s to a
 
more primitive mode of communicating through signs
 use
 
the word "primitive" here in a very literal
 
sense^—particularly to define the constrictive effect
 
inherent in communicating through sign3 as opposed to the
 
liberating effects inherent in communi'mating through
 
symbols.
 
In "Sign and Symbols," Susanne Langer offers an
 
extensive definition which distinguishes the differences
 
25
 
 between signs and symbols. A sign, Langer points out, IS
 
"anything that announces the existence Or the immanence of
 
some event . . . it is always a part qf the situation to
 
which it refers" (Bloom 529). Signs, therefore, require
 
little interpretation or thought; theyi are closely bo'und to
 
their referent. Animals, most notably, communicate tirough
 
signs (a dog bark "signals" a physical neted or "signci,Is"
 
immanent danger), but these patterns cf "communication" are
 
no more or less than direct stimulus-response reactions.
 
conditioned through time, whose meanir[g directly Corr
 
to stimuli experienced at the present. Therefore,
 
"communication" through signs is a behavioi: closely related
 
to a Skinnerian stimulus-response reaction. Furtheririore, a
 
sign is always situated in the immediate present. Signs are
 
bound by time and by place; as Langer states, they cause a
 
response "in the face of the thing signified" (531). They
 
are primitive, conditioned responses to the environment at
 
present. They never refer to the future because signs are
 
"always embedded in reality, in a present that emerges from
 
the actual past" (531). Because there is a direct
 
correlation between the sign and the s
 gnified, sign^^
 
refer to something at present, and are the only ways that
 
animals respond to their environment, In this manner
 
animals are prisoners of an immediate reality; they cannot
 
conceptualize alternative realities.
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 Although humans also respond to the environment through
 
sigfh-using behavior (we stop at fed lights, we answer bells,
 
we evacuate buildings in response to fire alarms), wd also,
 
- ■ . : . ■ ■' ■ I 
and primarily--both in a qualitative and quantitativ(E^ 
sense—use symbols to communicate. In contrast to 
sign-using, stimulus-response ways of reacting to the^ 
environment, humans have the^unique calpacity for using and 
formulating symbols which are not tied to an immediati 
present, nor necessarily to the thing signified. iristead^ 
as Langer asserts, "they serve to liberate humans fro;m the 
immediate stimuli of a physically pfesent World . . [and] 
allow us to think about the thing symbolized" (531). 
Symbols, therefore, allow thought because they allow for 
conceptualization of possible alternative ions as 
to what the symbol "means." Symbols never "mean" on one 
thing, as signs do; rather, they "suggest" a range of 
meanings because they can be "combined and varied in 
thousand ways, the result of which is a symbolic strujcture 
whose meaning is a complex of all respective meaningsi 
(531). Symbols, therefore, bring to mind a wide rang^ of 
possible meanings. They do not cause a simple stimulus-
response reaction, but allow and even demand thought oecause 
of their inherent complexity. 
Symbols also mark a fundamental boundary between animal 
forms of coirimunication and human forms of communicatiSon. As 
Langer states, "Animals thinks but they think of and it ■ . 
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things; [people] think primarily about things" (531). This 
ability to conceptualize, to be libergted from an ipniediate 
physical environment, to be able to fcrmulate alternative 
"meanings" are (iistihctly human ways of "making sense" of 
the past and present, but even more im;portantly, they allow 
us to think about and plan for the future. Symbols, then, 
are not bound to time and place as are signs. They allow us 
to think beyond what has been and what is to what may 
possibly be. And the chief means for 
transforming" our experiences is through language. As 
Langer states, "The birth of language is the dawn of 
humanity. . . The essence of language IS symbolic, not 
signific; we use it first and most vit to formulate and 
hold ideas in our own minds" (533). Ttie ability to 
manipulate and formulate the symbols o is,wtiat ■■ 
separates humans from animals. ThrOughi the use of symbols, 
^ . I - •
humans have the unique capacity for ught, something which
 
allows us to ponder, question, hope, a:id dream about things
 
not in our immediate physical or temporal environmentJ
 
However, with the regression from symbolization • o
 
signification in Gilead, a resultant regression in th jught,
 
and moreover, in humanness. begins to occur. And the|irocess
 
of deconstruction continues. In Gilead, not only has the
 
government limited access to the written word, it has also
 
deemed it necessary to signify a direc correlation b<
 tween
 
the sign and the signified. As shown in Offred•s reference
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 to "sign language," a picture of a fish is a fish. If the
 
picture (sign) of a fish is hot in th^ window, the fish does
 
not exist beyond the window. In the ame manner, the woman
 
who once existed before the time of Gilead has been
 
deconstructed; her name is no longer here, and as far as
 
the Gileadeans are concerned, she no longer exists.
 
In Gilead, signs, rather than syirbols, have becOTe the
 
means by which "reality" is known. Ttijere is no room for
 
interpretation; in Gilead, signs have replaced the symbolic
 
aspects of language. In this society, it appears, things
 
are "what they are." Ambiguity is treason. Prolifhiratidn
 
of meaning is prohibited. The powerfu1 have begun
 
reconstructing society and replacing subjects with objects,
 
symbolic meaning with literal meaning, fluidity with
 
rigidity, and consciousness with noncohsciousness.
 
What appears to be happenihg with this transition ffditi
 
symbols to signs is a type of breakdown, or regression from,
 
what Walker Percy, in Lost in the Cosmos; The Last Self
 
Help Book, has termed "triadic" relatiDnships. Triadfi-c
 
relationships, as the name implies, reguire three,
 
irreducible elements for any communicative act: a speaker,
 
an object, and a symbol (or word) whic
1 refers to the
 
object. This symbol is not the object itself, but only the
 
name of the object which brings to min<^ (or forms in the
 
consciousness) a concept of the object in a person's mind.
 
However, becanse language is restricted and words are
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replaced by "signs," most meaning-inaking in Gilead
 
approaches what Percy terms "dyadic" relationships;
 a
 
direct interaction between a single sijgn and an organism—a
 
type of relationship which allows for no choices, no other
 
possibilities, but only a direct stimulus-response re
action.
 
Meaning-making through the use of dyadic >s ■ is 
indicative of an organism which survives in its envirlonment 
through the mode of stimulus-response, It is simplisbic and 
it requires no thought. It is the worId lacking in 1:.;ioughb 
and consciousness^-it is the world of animals wherein each
 
action is only a response to a signal from the environment,
 
In fact, it is not even a world. It ie an environment in
 
the most literal sense, one in which there are no
 
alternatives for acting, one in which choices are limited,
 
one in which every action is a direct result of a single
 
stimulus: the sign. It is a world laccing in thought•
 
lacking in emotion, lacking in consqioiasness. It is :he
 
world of Gilead, where people have been demoted tb organisms
 
within an environment. It is the beginning of a world of
 
non-consciousness.
 
In Gilead, where the covert goals are to force people
 
to accept the new regime without question arid deconst
tuct
 
consciousness, the most evident place to begin restricting
 
human thought is language. However, b^ acting under •i:;he
 
illusion that language can only display literal meaning, the
 
government refuses to acknowledge that language is primarily
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a symbolic system. By limiting language to a system of
 
signs, those in power deny the fact that "language is
 
symbolic meaning system--it is a system composed mainly of
 
symbols that are used to communicate meaning from onei mind
 
to another" (Gasson 13). Therefore, language not
 
requires symbols, it also requires an interaction between
 
individuals who create and communicate meaning with those
 
symbols.
 
Ironically, what those in power did not seem to iealize 
when they tried to stifle language is ■j^hat once peopl# 
accept the illusion that language is a qbmmodity and c an be 
restricted and stifled, the effects criss all social, 
political, and economic boundaries. O^fred realizes this 
early on when commenting on the effect these changes lave 
had on one of the most influential pebple to bring about the 
current changes in language and in socj.ety: Serena Joy, the 
Wife of her Commander. Offred notes that before Gilead Was 
a reality, Serena had been on the lecture circuit, making 
speeches about "the sanctity of the home [and] how women 
should stay at home" (60). But Offred notes the 
contradiction in Serena's past life anel her present life: 
in her "past life," (her life before G2lehd) Sereha hairisel.fi 
had had a career, of sorts, giving these speeches. Hdwe^^er/ 
Offred notices that how the Gilea^ean concept has iDecome a 
reality, Serena "stays in her home, but it doesnVt seiS 
agree with her" (61) . Seeing the immeii|se gap that lies 
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between Serena's intent and her effect:, Off state "How
 
furious she must be, now that she's bfsen taken at her word"
 
(61). In Gilead, the society oppressess the oppressors as
 
well as the oppressed because all is t:aken literally When
 
meaning is stifled^ when the illusion that each word has a
 
distinct and literal meaning is belie'vfed, and when
 
interpretation is outlawed, then language loses the ymbolic
 
force which gives it life. When language dies, know],edge
 
dies. And when meaning is stifled, ncj) one can escape the
 
oppression.
 
It is exactly the type of environment constructed in
 
Gilead, through the limitations placecl on language, which
 
stifles the knowledge of the inhabitants and also the
 
society as whole. In The Development[of Perception.
 
Cognition. and Lahauaae. van Geert des'cribes the resuIt of
 
this type of environment: "In an environment without
 
alternatives for acting, there is nottiing to know or to
 
believe, since the conditions for expressing the knowledge
 
or the belief . . . are absent" (237). In Gilead, the
 
conditions for expression which are aJ:)sent, and whose
 
absence effectively diminishes the cocrnitive growth of the
 
populace, are the outward manifestaticms of language:
 
reading, writing, and conversation, By placing such
 
extreme restrictions on language, the society of Gilead
 
remains controlled, dominated by forcei and oppressiori and
 
lacks the flexibility necessary for ariy society to achieve
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 growth. This society, which bases it4 struoture on c
 
interpretation of a single text, quickly and dangeroi:sly
 
writes itself into rigidity. Ironically, this spclety, ■■ 
whose purported goal is to iinpiement "higher morality" (in
 
the Moral Majority sense of the wprd) ty in
 
both cognitive development and, what developmental
 
psycho1ogist Lawrence KhoIberg would refer to as, moxal
 
development.
 
Interestingly, Gilead provides a lucid example cf the
 
fourth stage in Kohlberg•s six stage schema of moral
 
development. Gilead is locked within the stage that
 
Kohlberg defines as "social system and conscience" wliich
 
appears at the second level of the three hierarchical
 
that he believes are necessary in the development of moral
 
meaning-making. Psychologist Robert %egan states that.
 
"Kohlberg•s stage four resolve[s] the historic conflict
 
between the individual and the group by deciding
 
for the group" (63). In this stage, the state takes primacy
 
over all; individuality is subsumed in order to creat3 the
 
state. At this stage of social/moral development, the
 
historic individual-versus-group dichotomy has disappeared
 
and has been replaced by an all-encompassing, oppressive
 
society.
 
The oppression that occurs in Gilead is illustrative of
 
the type of oppression one would expect to find in any "real
 
world" society based on a strict adherence to a "law-and­
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 order" ideology. In Kohlberg's hiers. , it is a point in
 
moral development where people have b4come Social obiiects,
 
rather than individual subjects, who, as Kegan states
 
are not guaranteed their distinctlness apart from their
 
identification with the social order. Kohlberg
 
four is essentially the psychplogical birth of
 
ideology, which is a meaning syst em which is abdve all
 
factional . . . This ideology ten d^s to draw linds of
 
membership in the human community according to tile
 
particular faction it makes ultim.ate, creating lat
 
Erikson (1972) called the "pseudo-species." (63 y
 
As with many fundamentalists, those who "make the rules" and
 
structure the Gileadean society are "moralists" in th£ most
 
extreme sense: their ideology is rigid and inflexible
 
because, as Kohlberg's model illustrates, their ideolpgy is
 
factional and does not allow for individual distinct! D^ns.
 
There is no individual identity because all is identi ied
 
with the group and the reigning ideology. This socie:y is
 
exclusionary in the most rigid sense: those who disagree
 
with, or challenge, the dominant ideology in Gilead are
 
exiled or executed. There is no room for dissension
 
The power structure of Gllead, loeked in KohIberg's Law
 
and Order stage of moral development, seems to assume that
 
if individuals think individual thoughts, or if they have or
 
construct any identity apart from the group, the socidty~or
 
"pseudo-species"~wil1 deteriorate- Individuality poses the
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most extreme threat to the Gileadean society, which suggests
 
why such stringent controls have been placed on langnjiage.
 
Controlling language is the means by v|rhich the ideology of
 
the new society is constructed and ma ntained, while at the
 
same time, individuality, identity, and "self" consc1ousness
 
are targeted for deconstruction. In Gilead, language
 
control is the chief iiteana W^ ttke group wages war
 
against the self.
 
Although Offred is subjected to the dehumanizinci forces
 
of the Gileadeans, she does, in many ways, resist th^ir
 
efforts to deconstruct her. As Chaptir 2 will deinonfftrate,
 
she resists complete deconstruction b^ utilizing inn€ir
 
language and the limited access she hcis to written arid
 
spoken language. Chapter 2 will also further explore;: the
 
dichotomies of self/other, social/indi.vidual, and
 
male/female—with a specific emphasis on how all of these
 
dichotomous systems relate to knowing and being--and|how
 
language acts as the bridge between tliese disparate
 
entities. In particular, it will explore the social nature
 
of language, and how society plays a nliajor role in
 
constructing the consciousness of the individual.
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CHAPTER 2
 
RECONSTRUCTION AND RENEWAL
 
The [person] who writes a seriou4 novel about the end
 
of the world—i.e., the passing f one age and the
 
beginning of another—must redkpn not merely like H.G.
 
Wells with changes in the enyirori:ment, but also with
 
changes in [human] consciousness which may be quite as
 
radical.
 
Walker Percy
 
"Notes for a Novel about the; End of the World"
 
Offred's immersion into the foreign and hostile I
 
environment of Gilead has subjected her to the process of
 
deconstruction. From society's perspective, she has become
 
nothing. She has lost her past identity; past ways'
 
knowing have been invalidated, and ways of making senlse of
 
the world through language have been restricted. Shel has
 
become an object, useful only as a means to a social end.
 
However, through Offred's narrative, Atwood demonstrates
 
that there are ways to transcend this state of nothingness,
 
She does not allow Offred to become on
ly a victim of L cruel
 
world. Instead, she writes of one woman's determination to
 
transcend and rebel against society's efforts to dehiimanize
 
her and deconstruct her consciousness Although there are
 
times when Offred feels that she will fade into nothi:igness,
 
she continues to question the regime—although this i 5 often
 
limited to internal questioning—and cDntinues to exp Lore
 
and define "where in reality" she live She strives to
 
make sense of her self and the externa1 world through
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language^ and in this way resists com;plete decOnstruptiOn
 
and begins the process of reconstruct ng her conscicaisness
 
and her self.
 
The chief obstacle that Offred confronts in her
 
reconstructive process is her inabilityy to access language.
 
■ i 
The "sins" of reading and writing are punishable by death in 
Gilead, because with reading and writing come an awareness 
of multiple points of view and a growth of the indivjidUal 
self. The power to write one's self is the power to 
challenge authority. Because the Gilc:adean governmeir 
restricts both the written and spoken word. Offred longs for 
communication. She misses language, she misses words, and 
throughout the novel, she "plays" with words, trying to 
remember the multiplicity of meanings and seemingly endless 
connotations that derived from words she used in her past 
life. Many times in the novel, she mu11s over meanings and 
savors the connotative power of words. For instance, when 
she considers the word "chair>"she thinks beyond the 
literal meaning, beyond the sign, and penetrates the symbol: 
I sit in the chair and think about the word chair. It 
can also mean the leader of a mee It can ajlso 
mean a mode of executipn. It is the first syllalDie in
 
the word charity. It is the French word for flesh
 
(140)
 
In this passage, Atwood vividly illustrates how the hiaman
 
mind "plays" with words, how word-symbols convey seem Lngly
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 endless meanings, and how, through a sort of free-

association, they allow us to think of many different, things
 
at once, things which don't readily 
apipeaf--at least on a
 
surface level—-to be connected in any way. As Offrcid
 
states (regardihg the previous passag4), "None of these
 
facts has any connections wfth the others" (140). ill bhe
 
sense, she's right: the facts have no conneGbion
 
with one another, except that they all. have been brought to
 
consciousness by the word-symbol chair On the other hand,
 
they do serve to illustrate an importe.nt way that the mind
 
connects things through patterning. 11 of the •'facts" (or
 
associations) that arise in her consciousness are triggered
 
by the word chair, just as in the proc
ess of free-

association, one word will trigger ancther, then another,
 
Free-association, then, is the exact opposite of the type of
 
cognitive "patterning" that the Gileadea:n government strives
 
to implement. Those in power strive for a patterning-system
 
which simplifies thought and restricts alternative ways of
 
viewing the world through limiting eonnotative and/or
 
symbolic meaning. They seem to be striving for a pfinciple
 
of uniform thinking among people, similar to the principle
 
of Praonanz in Gestalt psychology whic1 states that
 
recognize patterns by reorganizing stimuli to make thism
 
simpler, more complete, and more regular than they actually
 
are" (Woolfolk 238). This way of perc iving the world,
 
through recognizing patterns among diverse stimuli and
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 forming a simpler, mofe complete, men^al construct of them,
 
is a natural cognitive process. It i£5 a process which is
 
essential to making sense of the wbrlci since it is
 
difficult, if not impossible, to attei|i'd bo the multitude of
 
individual stimuli with which We are constantly bomb rded.
 
However, when taken to an extreme, thi.s way of thinking can
 
have a reverse effect: rather than h€iIpirig an individual to
 
form connections, it can limit the po^sible alternati.
 
"constructs" for meaning. Rather thari •'simplifying" through
 
reordering the world, enforcing a syst.em which"dictates"
 
connections has the effect of making he world "simp!istic."
 
Ironically, however, what Offred appears to be dioing
 
while "playing" with the word chair is actually the reverse
 
of Praqnanz: rather than forming patterns from diver}se
 
stimuli to simplify and "regulate" her world, she makes her
 
■ ■ ' ' ■ ^ ■ ■ i 
world more complex by conjuring up a ariety of ment-a1 
images with Only one symbol, the word chair. This process 
of making the simplistic more cbmplex-
-of actually 
constructing alternatives for a single symbol—is one^ 
example of how Offred rebels against the social norms and 
against society's effort to deconstruct her consciousness,
 
Here, she begins the process of reconstructing her
 
consciousness through the use of language.
 
Offred reveals the purpose bf this word play in another
 
way, stating, "These are the kinds of litanies I use, to
 
compose myself" (140). Thus, through language, Offred
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"Gomposes" herself, both in the familiLar sense of "caIming"
 
or "quieting" herself and ih the essential sense of
 
arranging or putting tbgether the separate "parts" or
 
elements of her consciousness (or as she says, my "sbIf") to
 
make complex, yet complete, whole. Through the intei nal
 
manipulation of language, Offrfed resists fra(^entatioh, b^^
 
deconstruction, and strives to remain whole and comp;,ete.
 
Through Offred's narratiye, Atwocj>d also confronl^s and 
explores the nature of psychological development and 
cognitive growth. The tension caused by the oppositionaT, 
dualistic relationships that Offred continually confionts, 
particularly the contrast between the past and the present, 
becomes the catalyst for Offred's reccinstructive process. 
Reconstruction in this sense can be seen as a process ■ of 
adaptation to a new environment which centers on, in 
Piagetian terms, the complementary processes of assimilation 
and accommodation to reach a state of In the 
process of assimilation, Offred strives to "fit" the 
language, customs, and rules of her new world into he 
existing cognitive schemes. In order to survive, she must 
re-encultrate herself; she must make sense of the new world. 
However, just as in any process of cognitive or 
psychological developiiient, this foreigh information niust be 
accommodated into her existing cognitive schemes. Because 
these schemes act to organize information and show 
relationships between and among things, a way Of , 
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"patterning" the world and making sen e^ of reality. Offred•s
 
existing cognitive structures must be a1tered in order to
 
assimilate this new information. In :his sense, the
 
narrative can be seen as a record df Offred's process of
 
striving for equilibration, a process defined by cognitive
 
psychologists as the search for "a ba ance between or.e's
 
cognitive schemes and one's experiences or perceptions of
 
the environment . ,. Eguilibration i$ the process b3| which
 
actual changes in thinking take place (Woo1folk 581). In
 
the process of equilibration, changes in thinking take place
 
because in striving for a balance betv e^en old and new
 
information, there are often parallel changes in perci
 
ways of patterning information, and ways of making sense of
 
the world. This process of equilibration is vividly
 
illustrated in Offred's attempts to re
-learn and mak€5 sense
 
of both her new world and also her seIf Reaching a state
 
of equilibration is essential to adaptation, and for
 
purposes of this paper, will serve to illustrate Off:red's
 
process of reconstruction.
 
Reconstruction, then, must take into account botti past
 
ways of knowing and ways of making sense of the world and
 
new (possibly antithetical) information and new ways of
 
patterning that information in order to make sense of it.
 
Because her present world is in direct ler
opposition to
 
past world. Offred must alter her ways of processing
 
information, of makihg sense of the worid. Therefore, much
 
  
of Offred'sreconstruGtive process reyolves around working
 
through the tension caused by striving to forget her 
life and, at the same time, trying to remember it. ■Ior 
instance, when she smells the yeast from freshly baked 
bread, it reminds her of herself in h«j:r past life whc n she 
was a mother. As she remembers the t;bme before, she states, 
"This is a treacherous smell, and I know Imust shut it out" 
(62). Offred's past memories are "tr s^acheroUS" in two 
distinct senses. First, they are Untrustworthy becai se she 
can no longer identify her self with those memories;: she 
must learn to shut them out in order to tolerate her new 
life of oppression. But in another sense, these memories 
equate with the Gileadean concept of treachery" becciuse in 
remembering her past life--and in the process acknow;! 
that there was any life, particularly a "better" 1if€i before 
Gilead^-equates with disloyalty in th^ regime. But even 
though the past is too painful to remiember, and her ii:iemories 
of it are untrustworthy. Offred knows that she must i:emember 
her past life in order to resist society's efforts to 
deconstruct her. Therefore, when she can no longer <|i 
remember her husband and daughter, sh^ becomes fruStriated 
and says, "It's my fault. I am forgetting too much" (250). 
Constantly bombarded by memories of the past, when things 
were "normal," she strives to shut th m^ out in order to 
endure the abnormalities of Gilead; y<et, at the same time, 
she knows that she must continue to remember, to reca;pture 
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her past life—-even in itiemories^-in hopes that she will one
 
day be reunited with her loved ones and her past life. In
 
this way, sh® continues to hope that she will one day
 
prevail. • • ■■ ■ ' ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ . " i • . 
■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ' ■■ ■ ; . ■ ■ ■■'' . 

Through the process of reconstrU'ction. Offred milst live 
in the space between forgetting and remembering. Shcl must 
strike a balance and reach a state of ion in order 
to make sense of her self in an alien world. And Ij 
language--both internal and external- is her chief mcians for 
reaching a state of equilibration, whd.ch is, in psychologist 
v J|;-' 
Robert Kegan's words
 
[T]he ongging conversatiort between the individuating 
organism and the world, a process of adaptation shaped 
by the tension between the assimllation of new 
experience to the old 'grammar' and the accommodation 
of the old grammar to new experienee. (44) 
Equilibration (or the search for balance), therefore is 
"shaped" by the tension between the oppositional and often 
contradictory forces of past "knowledge" and present 
understanding. In Offred's case, it is the search fgr .V' ­
"balance" between the antithetical constructs of her past 
memories and her piresent experiences. 
Sometimes, as Offred•s narration demonstrates, p,ast 
ways of knowing, or the "old grammar," are no longer :valid 
constructs for making sense of the worId at present, 
Therefore, new schemes must be constructed, new ways Iof 
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 perceiving and understanding the world must be formec , in
 
order for the "adaptive conversation" to emerge. Thl oughout
 
the novel. Offred must adapt he:r past ways of "makiriiG sense"
 
of the world to new ways of making sense of what appears to
 
I
 
be a senseless world. In the past, her language allc>wed for
 
metaphorical connections which connected disparate events
 
and/or entities and allowed each to comment on the other.
 
In this way, meaning Was allowed to multiply; it resisted
 
clear, concrete descriptiveness. However, in Gilead. meaning
 
is limited to the literal. Each sign
 
correlation to its signified, a situation wherein
 
proliferation of meaning is halted anci events, language, and
 
emotions become rigidified.
 
This enormous tension between her past memories and
 
present experiences forces Offred intc a psychologica;1 state
 
of disequilibrium. In order to strike a balance, she must
 
learn new ways of comprehending and processing the external
 
world. However, ways of doing this through language are
 
limited in Gilead. This restrictive meaning-making
 
environment is clearly depicted when 0ffred strives t;o make
 
sense of the a man who hangs from a hook on the Wall,
 
executed for his past crimes against ttie state. (The
 
picture of a fetus which hangs around tiis neck signif;:res
 
that he was a doctor who performed abortions in his 1Lfe
 
before Gilead.) She states that she sees what looks Like a
 
"smile made of blood" seeping from the dead man's mouth onto
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the bag which covers his head. Offred begins to make sens^^^^
 
of this image as, it is assumed, she would have done in the
 
pre-Gileadean world. She strives to comprehend the
 
significance of this image, and at first, relies on l:pr old
 
"grammar"—-connecting unrelated image£> through the u$e of
 
metaphor~to make sense of itv ThiS;d her i
 
statement, "The red of the smile is the same as the red of
 
the tulips in Serena Joy's garden" (4S). However, almost
 
immediately, she stops herself from mcLking the connection
 
and begins to see the images as disconnected and unrelated.
 
She states, "The red is the same but "tLhere is no connection.
 
The tulips are not tulips of blood, tlie red sffiiles are not
 
flowers, neither thing makes a comment on the other" (45).
 
As shown in these lines, Offred's state of disequilitirium—
 
her inability to adapt the old "grammar" to new expeiiience-­
forces her to abandon the metaphor. It is as if metaphors
 
are no longer valid constructs for meaning-making; like most
 
everything else in Gilead, they have become untrustworthy.
 
So instead of relying on metaphor, Of red "reads" the! scene
 
literally and states.
 
Each thing is valid and really th|«ere. It is thrbugh
 
such valid objects that I must pic k my way every day
 
and in every way. I put a lot of effort into ma!icing
 
such distinctions. I need to make  them. I needi to be
 
very clear/ in my own mind.
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This passage illustrates the tensiorji which exists between
 
Offred's past weiys of making sense of experience and her
 
present, 1imited ways of making sense of experience. In
 
Gilead, with the emphasis on denotaticj)n and "correctness,"
 
metaphors are scandalous because they cannot be "read
 
literally. As Walker Percy states/ fifom the point of view
 
of scholastics and semioticists, a metaphor is "scandialbus"
 
becavis® it appears to be wrong. Logically, a metaphor seems
 
like a "mistake" because "it asserts ne thing that is
 
something else-^and further, that its [significance] often
 
seems proportionate to its wrongness ir outlandishnes
 
("Metaphpr as Mistakew 67).
 
Metaphorical cphneCtions, tterefcre, because of their
 
poetic nature and their ability to go beyond the 1itesral
 
meaning, are dangerous ways to make se|nse of the worljd in
 
Gilead. If Offred had Contihued to ma:ke sense of this scene
 
through a metaphoriGal cpnstruct, it may have suggested, or
 
offered profound insight into, the "meaning" or significance
 
of the man's death. The two otherwise unrelated conqepts
 
might then have "commented" upon one another and Offted
 
would have gained a fuller insight not only of the iijlacfe
 
before her, but in a more general sens
e, how this im^ge
 
"comments" on other aspects of her worId and her existence.
 
If she were to use her past ways of "making sense" of the
 
world in Gilead, she might risk her own sanity because these
 
two things (the dead man and the healthy, living tulips)
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 when connected, not only comment on Iffe in Gilead, but
 
raise extremely important questions about what is valued and
 
nurtured in Gilead, and what is devalued and easilyjdisposed
 
of within the regime.
 
However, because of the unconscibnable horror o::
 
Gilead, Offred stops short of cohnecting these concepts.
 
instead, she makes a concerted effort to perceive eaeh thing
 
for what it is in concrete, actual, "/alid," and especially
 
literal terms. She has been trained "bo perceive the world
 
in this manner, focusing on individua1 concrete aspects
 
rather than on making metaphorical coinections.
 
Furthermore, it seems that this way of disconnecting;
 
concepts from symbolic meanings enables her to deal With the
 
horrors and atrocities of Gilead, beeause through distancing
 
the language used to describe and make sense of the icene,
 
she simultaneously distances her self from the scene,
 
Concrete, literal thinking enables her to "process"
 
information in an objective, unfeeling manner, which;!is
 
necessary for her self-preservation, In fact, Offred
 
'• • , ■ A, ' . ■ , ; t - ■ • 
states, "What I feel toward them is blankness. What I feel 
is that I must not feel" (44). She has learned she 
must see the dead man as "a valid object," and feel I jas an 
object herself, in order to endure the horror of Gilsad. 
Therefore, through forgetting her past and dist.ancing 
. ■ ■ ■■ ■ ■ ' ■ i ■ ■ 
herself from the Gileadean atrocities, Offred strives to
 
tolerate and endure her oppression. To preserve her self.
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she strives not only to forget her past, but also her
 
present: she tries not to feel anythihg and in this j way,
 
alienates her self from the external world. However] in
 
illustrating Offred's tendency toward apathy, Atwood does
 
not suggest that it came about only because of the Giieadean
 
regime. Rather, she shows that Offred learned this taqtic
 
for dealing with the world as a child, well before h^r life
 
in Gilead. In doing this, Atwpod shows that even "ordinary"
 
life, we cope by distancing ourselves from "reality* and
 
furthermore, by separating our minds Jrrom our bodiesi This
 
is evident in Offred's memory of how she learned not to
 
feel:
 
Steel yourself, my mother used td say/ before
 
examinations or swims in cold water. I never tiiought
 
much at the time about what the phrase meant, btit it
 
had to do with meta,l, with armor, and that's what I
 
would do, I would steel myself, I would pretend not to
 
be present, not in the flesh. (^06)
 
This pretending, this Cartesian mentality of severin body
 
from mind, is one Way in which people (both in dystopias and
 
in the "real world") survive. In Gildad, this form qf
 
protecting the self, in the form of mental escape, is the
 
way in which most people, from the mosjt powerful to t:he
 
least, are able to survive. In fact, Offred states that she
 
is not alone in this form of escape, illusionary as i|t may
 
be. The irony is that the Commander, she notices, embraces
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the body/mind duality as well, when bley must uridergb the
 
ritual of the Ceremony, as evidenced'In offred's line,
 
This State of absenbe, of existi^g apart from the body,
 
had been true of the Commander too. . .the sexuhl act,
 
although he performed it in a pe functory way, must
 
have been largely uncohscious fo: him, like scratching
 
himself. (206, 207)
 
In Gilead, the way to endure is to abandon the self cind
 
simultaneously abandon consciousness, The oharactefs have
 
quite literally objectified themselye^, other people,, and
 
the most intimate of experiences. On y in this way, of
 
seeing everything as object and nothing as subject, can they
 
disassociate themselves from the world and Ultimately from
 
themselves. Only in this way can they endure. As objects,
 
they survive; as conscious, feeling subjects, they risk
 
sanity and hope.
 
Although Offred is tempted to accept the body/mind.
 
subject/object Cartesian model, she resists defining her
 
self from a dualistic perspective. Instead, she persists in
 
trying to make connections and "fill j.n the spaces" between
 
the opposites. She resists simplistic either/or patterns of
 
"seeing" or "knowing" the world; she strives for a balance
 
between being and nothing. She persiSits in becoming more
 
than an object, but in doing so, realizes that she miist make
 
choices about her present situation and her future. These
 
choices are frightening however, becaiise they suggest;
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 alternatives to the Gileadean wbrld-view. In Gileadi,
 
choices equate with rebelliousness, As Offred says, "It's
 
the choice that terrifies me. A way out, a salyatioh" (80).
 
Offred cannot trust the "salvation" offered by the
 
Gileadeans, one wherein people are"saved"~ particuiarly
 
through the hideous ceremony of Salvaging—^from a wo:cld
 
where free agents make free choices. She cannot acceapt the
 
Gileadean definition of "salvation" w:lerein people nvuist
 
abandon their individuality and relinduish their selves for
 
the "common good" or a nebulous "latejr reward." Instead,
 
Offred looks for ways that she can saye herself from the
 
salvation offered by the regime.
 
In this effort, however. Offred ihust make choice
 
choices which themselves are terrifying. In the past;, the
 
ability to choose was one of the ways she defined hei Self
 
because with choice comes autonomy and freedom. But in
 
Gilead, this means of self-definition is no longer
 
available. Instead of autonomy, then, Offred relies on
 
language to make sense of her world and to connect with
 
Others in an effort to reaffirm herse]f. She relies on
 
language, because language has the caEiacity to cOnnect two
 
dispafate realities in the process of negotiating a
 
different reality. It is this connective process and social
 
interaction that Offred strives for in an effort to tioth
 
endure and prevail, and to reconstruct her self in the new
 
world.
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Although most of Offred•s reconstructive process is
 
isolated within her own mind^—a constant process of
 
negotiating between past and ptesent "ways of knowip:
 
there are instances when others try to connect with :ler and
 
break through her seif-imposed isblation. One of tlx 2 first
 
of these instances involves her shopping partner Ofg Len, who
 
"tries out" the password to the Undergtound—"mayday on
 
heir. However, because Offred has learned to d istrus:both
 
language and "bthers"^-in Gilead, botti may betray he;):—she
 
does not allow herself to enter into a dialogue with
 
Instead, she considers their form of communication as yet
 
another type of "sign" language, nothing more than "
 
whispers, projected through the funnels of [their] wliite
 
wings" (260). Their exchanges typify those which exi-st in a
 
system of signs rather than symbols, ^s shown in Offied's
 
reference to their discourse as being "like a telegriim, a
 
verbal semaphore. Amputated speech" (260). Because their
 
chances to engage in language are so ilighly limited. and
 
also because of Offred's fear and distrust, the context of
 
their exchange does not allow for the emergence of miich
 
meaning-making. As in a telegram or semaphore, the code
 
or "sign" has ope meaning and one meai|iing alone,
 
Therefore, when Ofglen does try out the "mayday'
 
password. Offred considers, at first, only the liter<
 
meaning of the words. Because she has learned to limit
 
meaning-making to the direct response to a sign, she
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believes that Ofglen is truly remarkijng on the beautiful May
 
day. It is only as an afterthought that she recalls that
 
the word has another meaning:
 
Mayday used to be a distress sighal, a long time ago.
 
It was Luke who told me about mayday. . .
 
It's French, he said. From m'aiLdez
 
Help me. (58)
 
Although Offred is able to go beyond the literal meaning
 
into the symbolic (or suggested) meanfng of the words/her
 
fear and distrust cause her to reject the "help me"
 
connotations of the discourse, and instead, she sett11 es for
 
the literal meaning. It is not until much later, when the
 
women have formed a bond of trust, that Ofglen is able to
 
disclose the nature and function of the password. Beicause
 
everything in Gilead is untrustworthy] and fear and
 
alienation separate people and disallc)w for communicdtion.
 
Ofglen and Offred must build a bond of trust before either
 
feel free to disclose their true feel^-ngs about the ifegime.
 
Therefore, although there are soriie opportunities for
 
Offred to engage in a dialogue and affirm both her sIf and
 
her true feelings about the regime, shie has undergone the
 
process of re-encultration and has learned that language not
 
only has the power to construct alternative realities, it
 
also has the power to confine. She has learned to distrust
 
metaphors, for they only magnify the horror of Gileaql She
 
has learned to alienate and isolate herself from others, to
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 the point that she can no longer trust their discourse
 
goals. She has even learned that her own memories are no
 
longer trustworthy, that everythihg is really a
 
reconstruction/ and that she must on "concrete reality"
 
and "valid objects" to roaXe sense of tier new environment,
 
She has learned to respond to her environment as an animal
 
does, through atteriding to signs—to he literal meanling of
 
things-^rather than symbols, and to a/oid danger and
 
risk-taking at all costs. She has ad pted to the
 
environment in such a way that passiv Lty and acceptance seem
 
to be the only alternatives to the ho:|rror of Gilead.
 
On a surface level, Offred s®®ros to have accepted the
 
regime's efforts to deconstruct her to a state of
 
nothingness,* yet at a deeper level, she resists
 
deconstruction. She continues in her quest to become more
 
than nothing; she Gbntinues the process of reconstructing
 
her self and strives for equilibration Through this
 
process, she "fills in" the space betvreen the two
 
dichotombus states (or conditions) of being and nothing. In
 
direct opposition to the state of nothingness imposecil on her
 
by the regime is Offred's quest to recbnstruct her self,
 
which includes on one level, the need to adapt to the;
 
environment in order to survive, and h another level,
 
embraces all aspects of being, a state wherein she strives
 
to redefine herself and empower herself in ah effort not
 
only to endure the horrors of Gilead, but to continue hoping
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that some day she will prevail. These oppositional
 
states—nothing and being-^continual]y wage war and
 
for Supremacy within Offred. It is er constant strjuggle to
 
avoid being defined as nothing—whicti the Giieadean jpower
 
■ " : '1 
structure wants so desperately for heir to accept—etl
 
instead all aspects of being, which \ividly illustra'tes the
 
active, and often terrifying and confusing, process iOf
 
"Becoming," of reconstructing or redefining one's owln self.
 
By focusing on this process of psychelogical and ontj
 
growth, Atwood demonstrates how essertial it is to dvoid
 
embracing either pole of a dichotomy, She will not accept
 
either/or alternatives; she continues to explore and! write
 
the space between.
 
By immersing her character in bhe space in betft'ieen,
 
" ' ' ' ■ ■ ' ' 1 
Atwood explores various alternative w.ays of "knowingi" and
 
ways of "being." By writing the space in between, sjhe
 
illustrates the fundamental ontologic.a1 process of mjaking
 
sense of the world in relation to the self and the
 
simultaneous process of making sense of the self in relation
 
to the world. In doing so, Atwood demonstrates her
 
for going beyond either/or alternative ways of knowirig,
 
defining, and describing the self and the world. Tlijiroughout
 
the novel Atwood writes the spaces between dichotomies, not
 
only the being/nothing dichotomy, but also the dichojtomles
 
of subject/object, self/other, male/female, and social/
 
individual.
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Even though there are times in t:he novel when £(f fred 
tries to connect with others, for a 1arge part of the novel 
she is limited to making sense of the atrocities in jiSilead 
internally. She does not have access to external "ways of 
knowing" (e.g., cqhVersation, reading and writing);| 
therefore, her narrative is limited to what might bo defined 
as an internal monologue. However, as shown in her jLine 
"You don't tell a story only to yourself. • ThereVs. a[ 
someone else" (52), her narrative includes a strong i ofsense 
"other-ness" and of the Social nature and function o;:E 
language. In this way, her Story migtit be more spec|
• ■ ■■ ■;; ■ ■ .■■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ „ • ■ • i 
defined as an inteirnal dialogue, composed of her vole:e from 
the present, commented upon by internalized "voices"| of the 
past, and directed to an imagined listener who acts Ito 
"affirm" the story in Offred•s very act of telling ii 
With her emphasis on social intejraction, in coni 
with "others" in the pursuit of negoti 
Atwood demonstrates the dialogic nature of making meaning, 
She implies that meaning cannot be ived through a 
monologue; it requires constant negotiation with others in 
an effort to procure an agreed upon meaning. It is fa 
continuing dialogue which constantly strives to fill in the 
spaces between disparate realities and between conf1 
dualities. It is a dialogue focused on :i: 
making meaning, affirming selfhood, and constructing the 
consciousness thi^ough the symbols of anguage. In "'Semiotic 
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and a Theory of Knowledge,'^ Wialker Percy states that, this 
dialogue is essential to itteaning-makihg and is fundamental 
to the construction of huina;n consciousness: 
Without the presence of another, symbolization uannot 
conceivably occur because there is no one from tfhom the 
word can be received as meaningfu1. The irreduiiible 
condition of every act of symbolization is the 
renderihg intelligibie; that is to say, the foilmulation 
of experience for a real or an i.mp1ied someone else. 
■ ■ ■ ■(257) 
Although historically, ;particuia|rly in the Victierian 
tradition, self-knowledge and knowing-in-general hav<i been 
thought to originate withiri monologue5, Atwood suggel3ts that 
even in what appears to be an internal monologue, vo|Lces of 
"others" are present. In a true monologue, there woi,lid be 
only one voice, but because the function of language! is to 
communicate-—to co-conceive of experienee—and since any
; , 1 
symbolic communicative endeavor requires a triadic 
relationship—one who originates the symbol, the syml)Ol 
itself, and the receiver who makes the symbol meaninc 
(even if that receiver is one's own self)—then even thought 
itself can be considered a dialogue, In the telling of her 
story, then, Offred's "listener," or jimagined other, acts to 
render intelligible her ordeal in the new world. In this 
' \ ' V . • ■ r' j 
way, her experience becomes meaningfu because there I is an 
implied other who can "co-conceive" and affirm her 
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 experience. Through dialogue, even s dialogue conshructed
 
in her head, Offred begins to connect with others ahd begins
 
to formulate and assign meaning to her experiences. She
 
relies on this dialogue because it is a key element in her
 
process of reconstructing her conscicusness; as Percy
 
states, "When the dialogue stops, consciousness stops"
 
(Signposts 148). Therefore, in order t6 continue her
 
process of reconstruction, Offred must continue conn)ecting
 
with others. She must continue the dialogic process of
 
meaning-making.
 
In her quest for intersubjectivity, her need to:
 
connect, Offred "listens" and hopes fbr the voice of
 
another. In a crucial scene, she "hears" this voice- in the
 
form of a "message" left by the Handmaid Who preceded her
 
Like the password "mayday" which was used by Ofglen in a
 
previous effort to communicate, the message is also in a
 
foreign language—in the phrase Nolit(3 te bastardes
 
carborundorum—Which she finds shortly after her arr;)Lval to
 
the Commander's house, etched in a coirner of her closet.
 
This is the first and only written message that Offred
 
receives, and she believes that this message was meaiit for
 
her. Because she cannot understand tlie literal mearijhg of
 
the message, it means many different things to Offree;: she
 
regards it at first as a kind of pray«»r; later, as a
 
command; and most often as "ancient h--eroglyph to whiich the
 
key's been lost" (190). And even though she cannot iiiake
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literal sense of it, for the first titme since her .
 
consignment, she feels that she is "cpoitimuning" with another.
 
She states, "It pleases me to ponder His message. It
 
i
 
pleases me to think I'm communing witth her, this unkiiown
 
i ■ • ■ 
woman" (69). It seems as if this shatring of experiepce
 
through language, even a language tha
t she cannot decipher.
 
gives her hope. It is as if she is now part of a cojiiimunity,
 
■ . . ■ ■ i ■distinct and separate from the Gileadean regime. Fo.i;|' a
 
moment, she is no longer an object, but a receiver of" a
 
symbol, a symbol which allows her hope.
 
Paradoxically, the message's "meaning" becomes even
 
more ambiguous when it is interpreted
 
Commander. What is truly ironic in this scene is that the
 
phrase—scrawled in the margin of a tcixtbook by the
 
Commander when he was a "schoolboy"—j.s written in a crude
 
and bastardized form of Latin, represesnting the ultiniiate
 
breach of linguistic propriety and convention. This
 
message, however, has survived from th[<e time before, a time
 
when the Commander also "played" with language and
 
transgressed the rules imposed upon it. It came from the
 
time when he questioned authority and convention, rattier
 
. ■ ■ Ithan implementing stringent conventions through his
 
authority.
 
After the Commander shows Offred the "original"
 
message, written beside a defaced picture of the Venuis de
 
Milo in the book, he tells her that it was only a
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 "schoolboy's joke." With the translation-—"Don't let the
 
bastards grind you down"^^—Offred understands the literal
 
meaning of the message, but she also understands that the
 
previous Handmaid must have learned the message in the
 
Commander's study. Offred feels uneasy, jealous even, with
 
her realization, "I have not been the first then. TtD enter
 
his silence, play children's word games with him" (242).
 
One critic has suggested that after Offred realizes iler
 
predecessor learned this phrase in the Commander's si:udy.
 
and is informed that the original iiiessage was "only a joke,"
 
it would appear that
 
[T]he piece of text loses its status as a messai:e and
 
therefore its potential to comfoirt Offred. Not
 a
 
message of sisterhood at all, it is, at least pi obably/
 
a male text, in a language as debased as the phc:3to of
 
the Venus de Milo. (Bergmann 84<?)
 
Perhaps this is so. But perhaps, in an ironic way, c!»ffred's
 
discovery of the original message forms an even strojs^ger
 
bond of sisterhood between the two woiiien, an affirmatLioh of
 
sorts, between "spirits" of the past: one spirit who haunts
 
Offred's room, the other "spirit" (Offred's past self) which
 
continues to "haunt" Offred's body. 1 would like to suggest
 
that it still offers her hope, and retrains its status as a
 
message, because it is the one thing t;hat she contimJies to
 
repeat. Whether or not it is in a "me.le language," she
 
relies on it in her process to become more than an object
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and to reconstruGt her self. She may, in fact, contilnue to
 
see the message as a sign of willful persistence, a message
 
both of hope and of spite. Like Moira's persistent guest
 
for freedom/ it offers hope. Even like Serena Joy's
 
insistehCe on knitting rows and rows of little boys and
 
girls and evergreen trees, it is "evidence of her
 
stubbornness, and not altogether despicable" (263). It is a
 
message whose meaning becomes ambiguous once she discovers
 
the meaning and the source; however, it is an ambiguity that
 
offers enough hope for her to cpntinue to endure. A|t times,
 
it offers enough hope for her to believe she may prelvaii.
 
In the Gileadean world of either/or, Offred's ohly
 
alternative to hoping is to believe ttiat "If my life is
 
bearable, maybe what they're doing is all right afte:ir all"
 
(243). But she knows that it isn't a11 right; she C|!>ntinues
 
to repeat the message, continues to d:raw strength from it.
 
Even in her most despairing times, when she contempli^tes
 
withdrawing so far into herself, "so far down and back that
 
they could never get [her] but" (291), when she sees herself
 
as "a blank, between parentheses. Be ween other people,"
 
she repeats the phrase to herself. Ev^en after seemli
 
convincing herself that the phrase is not magical, i'
 
doesn't offer hope, when she repeats It and her only
 
response is "Fat lot of good it did hdr . . . Why fie
 
(291), she immediately fea1izes that she cannot give up
 
hope. She sternly tells herself, "That will never do"
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(291). Constantly in this battle between being and nothing,
 
between despair and hope, between truSt and fear. Offred
 
knows that she must maintain whatever connections she can.
 
She must be valued, validated, affirmed. She latches on to
 
any language which will offer her this hope and continue to
 
commune with others who share her hope. In this way, hoping
 
that someday she'll get out, Offred continues to end}
are.
 
However, conflicting with her need to endure in Gilead
 
is her need to survive within herself She wants to be, ■ 
conscious of the world around her; she wants to thin:c; she 
wants to regain her status as subject When asked b T the 
Commander, "What would you like?," shB replies, "I wcould 
1ike to know" (243). However, she a1 lo realizes how much 
more powerful the Commander is than sle is, as shown ij in her 
line, "But watch out, Commander, I tell him in my head. 
I've got my eye on you. One false mo^/e and I'm deadj (113).
 
Because of this enormous difference in power, Offred
 
oscillates between thirsting for knowledge and then trying
 
to convince herself that she really doesn't want to };;now
 
after all. Her oscillation between giving voice to lier
 
desire for knowledge and the subsequent repression of that
 
desire is evident in her statement, "Maybe I don't
 
want to know what's going on. Maybe 'd rather not know.
 
Maybe I couldn't bear to know" (252). But she does want to
 
know, and because she wants to know, she takes risks which
 
could cost her her life.
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 The most notable, and also probably the most ironic way
 
that Offred takes risks, and "breaks the rules" impojsed by
 
the regime, is by consenting to join the Commander in his
 
study—^an "oasis of the forbidden"~within which evelrywhere.
 
blatantly is the written word, "Books and books and Dooks,
 
right out in plain view, no locks, no boxes" (177). And in
 
this oasis of the forbidden is the opjportunity for Offred to
 
experience her first taste of freedom
 
Offred enters the forbidden and chooses (in a sc nse) to
 
break the rules, thinking that the Co;inmander wants to do
 
something indecent, illicit, forbidden, all adjectives
 
suggestive of a Sexual encounter in tle world before Yet,
 
even though he has not asked her into his study for a sexual
 
encounter, but rather to play a game of Scrabble witii him.
 
Offred realizes—after forcing herself not to laugh dLt the
 
banality of the request—that even thti game of Scrabl:>le-—
 
"playing with words"--has taken on nev^ dimensions: Now
 
it's forbidden, for us. Now it's dangerous. Now it
 s
 
indecent. Now it's something he can't: do with his Wlfe.
 
Now it's desirable" (179). Before, Sci'abble was only a game,
 
and not highly prized by Offred. It vras game played by old
 
men and women in retirement hom(as, anc. in her mother s day,
 
a game of adolescents. It was out-of-|date and old-fashioned
 
and not of interest to her. However, now that Offred has
 
such limited access to language, since language is
 
considered a commodity in Gilead, a highly guarded o:in(e at
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 that, the game takes on new dimensioiis for her. It is not
 
only the game itself, but what it represents: unlijsiited
 
think, c
possibilities to manipulate language, to •Chin to hoose,
 
to become empowered. opportunitij
Because she has| the y to
 
create words, to manipulate language-
-in both a literal and
 
a figurative sense—she takes on a new dimension of
 
humanness, and sees herself as subject rather than olbject
 
and the Commander takes on this new dimension of humanness
 
as well. They are no longer objects, Language alloi's them
 
to think, and it fills in the space between emotion and
 
logic. Language allows her to bridge the disparity !between
 
mind and body; language allows her to think and feel
 as
 
suggested in the following lines, "I hold the gloss;
 
corners with their smooth edges, finger the letters, The
 
feeling is yoluptupus. This is freedom, an eyeblink of it .
 
. .What a luxury" (180).
 
For Offred, access to language, 1(10 matter how maindane,
 
is euphoric. In this passage, Atwood
 
and provocative nature of language, (bffred feels the words,
 
she feels their power; they offer posssibilities and
 
alternatives. Through language, Offreid realizes, comes
 
thought and a renewed sense of self, With language. she no
 
longer has to suffer being defined by others. Language
 
offers her the chance for self definittion and self
 
affirmation.
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However, there are certain drawtacks to Offred s word-

playing liaison with the commander, Although she feels
 
somewhat empowered—"It*s difficult for me t^o beliefel have
 
a power over him, of any sort, but I do" (272)--she klsb
 
realizes that her lack of fear, diminished through her
 
empowerment, can be dangerous. She knows that any ppwer she
 
has is of "an equivocal kind" (272). She knows who holds
 
the real power, and that she is really no more than phe
 
Commander's mistress. (One step up from a Handmaid,[to be;
 
certain, but a baby step at best.) A chasm remains ikstweeri
 
her and the Commander—in relation to power, choice, and
 
freedom—-and that chasm is never filled in. The
 
hierarchical power structure is not overturned. Shcn :[ can
 
never quite join with him because the power structura, which
 
he helped create, will not allow it. Language in Gilead is
 
patterned to separate rather than to join, and as their
 
attempts to connect through playing Scrabble illustrate,
 
even intellectual intercourse in Gileeid is disjointed and
 
unfulfilling. As Offred states, "If j.t were sex it would be
 
a swift furtive stand-up in an alley somewhere" (194)
 
Through exploring this inability to join in
 
communication, Atwood illustrates yet another duality at
 
work in both the novel and the "real" world: oppositlional
 
and asymmetrical ways in which conversational goals aire
 
generally perceived by males and females. In both hipir
 
internal and external ways of speakingi Gffred typicajlly
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illustrates what might be defined as
 
"feminine'' wayj of
 
speaking. As linguist Deborah Tanneri points out, th
e goal
 
in feminine communication is intiinaci which focuses on
 
creating connections and forming comnunity. On the
 other
 
hand, in masculine discourse, the goal is to achieve 
or
 
maintain status by keeping the "Upper h^nd" in
 
conversations/ "winning'? discussions, and dominatihg
 
conversations. In status~oriented conversations, an
 
individual perceives the world, and therefore engage 3 in it.
 
as "an individual in a hierarchical social order in which he
 
is either one-up or one-down" (Tannen
 24), Tanhen sii ggests
 
that conversations in this world are jiegotiations
 
in which people try to achieve and maintain the
 
upper
 
hand if they can, and protect themselves from o

:hers'
 
attempts to put them down and push them around,
 Life,
 
then, is a contest, a struggle to preserve
 bendence
 
and avoid failure, (25)
 
Due to his goals of achieving/maintaining status and
 
avoiding failure, the Commander "speaks'' a language lii hose
 
are governed by logic and reason and driven by his
 
fears of being perceived inadequate arid/or weak. He
 
must
 
keep the upper hand in his exchanges With Offred; he
 
continues to assert his authority over her. In speak
ing
 
with her, he continues to command, rat
her than sugge t, the
 
terms of the conversation. He orders
 her to play Scrabble
 
with him (and she knows the consequene:es of makibg hin feel
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silly by "shrieking with laughter" at the request, so she
 
complies); he sets the 1imits on the amount of time that
 
they will play; he decides when the ga:me is over and!tells
 
her when it!s time for her to "gb home " Therefore,!even
 
though he allows her access to languagie, the rules governing
 
the context of the ia^ are still
 in his control He is
 
still in control of her mind, her body, and her actions. On
 
other occasions as well, the Gommandeir decides what 1 e and
 
Offred will converse about (in linguisjtic terminology he
, 

initiates conversational topics—a siqn of conversational
 
dominance) and in which context they yill speak. The
 
context is generally one of her submisision to his aut:hority,
 
and it is also drained of thought and emotion. When Offred
 
does bring up the topic of the "message" and asks what
 
happened to the woman who wrote it, tl.e Commander tellIs her
 
that she hanged herself, and then adds, "That's why ftle had
 
the light fixture removed. In your rcdm" (243). But he
 
states all of this, not with emotion ri
or with a sensd of
 
sadness or of loss, but rather with "t
 (243).
 
With his lack of emotion, Offred
 
, ■ once 
again, how little valued she is in Gilead. Even with (or
 
possibly especially with) the Gommander, Offred real!zes
 
that she is still no more than an object, although sh
a•s
 
gone from being an object of reproduction to an objec
 with
 
whom the Commander can sinfully Scrabble and even "dress up"
 
like a plaything for an illegal and illicit "night on the
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 town" at Jezebel's. She realizes that she is a replacement
 
for his former mistress, and that she, too, is replaceable,
 
as shown in her line, "If your dog dies, get another" (243).
 
Communioation, then, when its terms are dictated in a
 
masculine way-^when the speaker's goaIs are to avoid'
 
humiliation, preserve independence, and avoid failuriie--will
 
act to further disconnect and alienate others. It rastricts
 
movement and further isolates the communicators intoi their
 
respective spheres of nothingness. It does not unite and
 
join—it divides and conquers.
 
Offred's conversational goals, hbwever, focus oh
 
connecting with others and forming bonds of mutual risspect
 
and trust. Her primary goals are to puild a sense of
 
community, renew a sense of hope, and reaffirm herse.|Lf in an
 
effort to make sense of the world. T'le desire to acl:lieve
 
these goals is based on her effort to overcome her s®mse of
 
nothing, in order to continue reconstructing and continue in
 
her process of becoming more than an pbject. In attaining
 
these goals, then, her primary focus 4^ not on the
 
hierarchical, adversarial contexts of speech, but rather on
 
language's power to unify and join, ^rom her interactions
 
with others. Offred desires intimacy eind approaches 1 he
 
world as "an individual in a network of connections" (Tannen
 
25). In this world, Tannen suggests, individuals strive to
 
make connections in an effort to avoid isolation. Their
 
chief goal is the formation of community, in an effoht "to
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 protect themselves from others* atteiri]pts to push them away"
 
(25). Tannen states that people who^e conversational1 goals
 
focus on intimacy have a world view W-herein "life id a
 
community, a struggle to preserve intimacy and avoid
 
isolation" (25). In her effort to establish connections
 
with others, to negotiate rather thani "dictate" what; is
 
known about the world and about the £elf, Offred cor:tinues
 
to strive to "commune" with the other, to form bonds of vN,;;; ,:
 
intimacy and trust.
 
However, because she and the Coirimander still cqnverse
 
in ways that their previous language, in times before
 
Gilead, dictated—rational, unemotional, and status
 
oriented^—-they fail to agree on what the world means and
 
what they mean in relation to each other, or what the goals
 
of their conversations truly are. Their conversational
 
goals remain in opposition. This conflict in conversational
 
goals only acts to further confuse Offred in het quieSt to
 
reconstruct herself. Is she an object, useful primafrily
 
only for breeding purposes who moves up the hierarchiy and
 
becomes an object with which the Commander might "entertain"
 
himself, whether sexually, in game piaying rendezvous, or to
 
be watched during her "illicit reading that seems like a
 
kind of performance" (239)? Or is she more than that?
 
Does he really see her as a thinking, feeling being? Offred
 
doesn't ever answer these questions directly; she nef/er
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states what she "is" to the Coramander Instead, she defines
 
herself in relation to hiin by what she isn't:
 
To him I'm no longer mbrely a usable body. To ;him I'm
 
not just a boat with no cargo, a chalice with ri^o wine
 
in it, an oven—to be crude—minus the bun. To him I'm
 
not merely empty. (211)
 
She has become more than nothing, but still defines lerself
 
in relation to nothingi She remains immersed in the!
 
confusing, painful, and difficult process of "becoming," in
 
which ambiguity and uncertainty play |a major role.
 
Although much of the dialogue between the Commander and
 
Offred reflects this status/intimacy apposition; it is not
 
only Offred who strives for intimacy nor the Commandeir who
 
strives for status. Indeed, in some instances, thesfi roles
 
are reversed and the Commander allows his "feminine" voice 
to replace his masculine voice. Instead of struggling for 
dominance, he desires intimacy as shown most noticea.1)ly in 
his request that Offred kiss him "as if [she] meant t" ■ ■ 
(181). However, when the Commander strives for intimacy, it 
is as if he is using a foreign language, or at least 
language with which he is not familial:. Offred, fluent in 
the language of intimacy, realizes this immediately. She 
hears not only the words he speaks, but also the rhythm, the 
intonation, and the diction. She eatb^es the "falsity'' of 
the conversation, even the falsity of his wotd cholcfi? 
(describing himself as "an ordinary^ guy"), which 
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 cause her to be on the defensive. A].though she is aching
 
for communication and feels "speech backing up insi^e of
 
her/" she resists The Commander's attempts at intimaicy,
 
thinking, "If I talk to him I'll say something wrongi, give
 
something away. I can feel it cominc[, a betrayal of myself,
 
I don't want him to know too much" (239). What she feels is
 
at risk is her self, the self she has been able to
 
reconstruct up to this point. She chooses not to take the
 
risk, as much as she, too, desires ir|timacy and
 
conversation.
 
Therefore, although Offred realizes that the Commander
 
wants intimacy, she also realizes that she cannot give him
 
what he wants. He is her adversary, one whom she ha
 
learned not to trust. Even though he strives for iinjbimacy,
 
the falsity of his request and his unfami i iarity wit:ti the
 
language of intimacy cause her to pull away from himi She
 
understands that intimacy is something not won through force
 
nor might nor conversational dominance, but rather tlat it
 
requires a pre-established bond of trust, something that
 
Offred does not feel has yet been established between them
 
So, although the Commander has become more real for tier
 
through the sharing of Xanguage (as stie states, "He is ho
 
longer a thing to me. That was the problem . . . It
 
complicates" [207]), she still Cannot trust him with
 
intimacy. At this point, she cannot risk trusting him at
 
all. Ironically, what she has achieved through dlstincing
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herself from him are the masculine gcals of status oriented
 
speech: she does not give anything away and preserves
 
whatever dignity and independence she feels she has gained
 
at this point in Gilead.
 
In most of their conversationsj Offred and the
 
Commander continue to oscillate between intimacy and status
 
as the goals of their exchanges. Their goals are always in
 
opposition because the society which dictates their
 
respective places in a hierarchical s/stem has "written the
 
rules" which predetermine them to be adversaries. He is
 
powerful; she is weak. He makes decisions; she abides by
 
them. He defines himself; she is defIned by him. He is
 
free; she is enslaved. They exist in opposition; hence,
 
their discourse reflects and reinforces this oppositional,
 
adversarial relationship. Whether either speaks a f4
iminine
 
or a masculine language, they continue to speak in
 
opposition. Therefore, they never are able to truly
 
communicate, and are confined to playing word games T^^ith one
 
another without ever forming a strong connection or c
 
a bond of intimacy.
 
With the Commander, Offred is never able to strike a
 
balance. She continues in her pursuit, to unify the
 
polarities between masculine/feminine ways of being and ways
 
of knowing, but she never overturns the system, she
 
proceeds in the spaces in between dichotomies, and searches
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for a way of being which will allow l^er to endure wliile
 
hoping to prevail.
 
According to Sherrill Grace, this tendency to work
 
through, rather than overturn, dichotjomous relationsihips and
 
to resist the tendency to pattern the world as a system of
 
oppositions, is a distinctly Canadian world view. Rather
 
than embracing either pole of a dicholtomous extreme-

particularly those of social/individuial, subject/ obigect,
 
male/female, or public/private—therel
 
and reinforcing these dichotomous patt erns, Grace states
 
that Canadians have historically stri v^en to cOnstrucit a
 
vision which is "pluralistic and communitarian," one| which
 
is "resistant to subject/object dichotomies" (3). I;
- is
 
this Canadian (although not exclusively Canadian) coitimitment
 
to community, to the formation of bonds and relation!­
: ■ ■ , ' I 
by lending credence to
 
between individuals, specifically through language, tbhat
 
weaves the fabric of many of Atwood's texts and is
 
particularly evident throughout Offred's narrative ih The
 
Handmaid's Tale. In this sense, language is the mediator,

■ , ij 
or agent of interaction, which is essential for working
 
through the tension caused by dichotomies. In Grace's
 
words, language fills in the "space in between" pol0s in a
 
dichotomous relationship. In discussing two previou novels
 
by Atwood (Bodilv Harm and Sjirfacing), Grace concludes that
 
Atwood refuses to be silenced by the "space between,"
 
and she consistently affirms the power of langua.ge to
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fill in the gap, to create a tft rd way of being out of
 
the either/pr alternatives whichi her system resists and
 
at moments negates. (3)
 
The Handmaid's Tale attests to Atwooe
•s resistance dgainst
 
j
 
embracing either term in a dichotomy. In her narrative,
 
Offred resists embracing either the static concepts of being
 
or of nothing; she knows that in Gilead, both are il
lusions
 
and she can be defined by either or both at the sj
ame
 
time. In the final analysis, her narrative is a texituai
 
record of her reconstructive process of "becoming," la
 
process which demands interaction with others, through
 
language, in an effort to reconstruct and affirm her own
 
consciousness and make her world meaningful. And as
 
Offred's narrative demonstrates, through writing the space
 
between, she comes to know her self.
 
This chapter has examined the ways that Offred'
 
narrative writes and "fills in" the blank text, the :space
 
between dichotomies and disparate entities. In Chap:er 3, I
 
will examine the ways that Atwbod writes the space between
 
yet another dichotomy, that of darkness and light. Chapter
 
3 will also explore the relationship between—or "space
 
between"—reader and writer, fbcusing on how each might join
 
with the other—interacting through t!le written word4—in an
 
effort to make the world of the text, and possibly even
 
their own worlds, more meaningful.
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 CHAPTER 3
 
AMBIGUITY, UNCERTAINTY, AND THE QUEST FOR FREEDOM
 
Writing, no matter what its subject, is an act of
 
faith; the primary faith being t:hat someone put there
 
will read the results. I believe it•s also an act of
 
hope, the hope that things can tje better than they are.
 
If the writer is very lucky and lives long enough, I
 
think it can also be an act of charity.
 
Margaret Atwood, "An End to Audience?"
 
Through her narrative, Offred writes the space ibetween
 
many dichotomies, and in the process, reconstructs har self.
 
However, at the end of her narrative she is once again
 
positioned between another pair of contrasting imhges: the
 
images of darkness and light. In this final scene, she once
 
again confronts ambiguity—her death or her new life 
—an
 
ambiguity which she has learned can ba more freeing than the
 
illusion of certainty because of the ]3pssibilities ai;Id
 
choices it offers. Therefore, in the novel's closincg scene,
 
Offred chooses once again to immerse !lerself into the space
 
between, and "step[s] up, into the darkness within; or else
 
the light" (378).
 
For readers who don't share Offred's appreciation for
 
ambiguity and uncertainty, for those vrho don't pereeive the
 
freedom inherent in ambiguity, this scene may be
 
frustrating. It leaves unanswered questions. But fcir .
 
Offred, who has learned to see in the darkness as wel1 as in
 
the light, the scene allows her the opportunity to on
ce
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again go beyond either/or ways of knciwing and being. The
 
ambiguity she confronts allows her td enter the realm of
 
uncertainty, the realm where choices and alternative
 
reside. But in order to appreciate and even embrace
 
ambiguity, Atwood seems to suggest that one must be |able to
 
see in and appreciate both the darkness and the lights and
 
moreover, to appreciate any source of light, no matter how
 
little there is to see by. Atwood ma:Ices this point not only
 
in The Handmaid's Tale. but also in ttie final lines of her
 
later novel. Cat's Eve. In the final scene of that novel,
 
the central character and narrator, ELaine, looks out the
 
window of an airplane and states.
 
Now it's full night, clear, moonless and filled with
 
stars . . . Echoes of light, shining out of the midst
 
Of nothing. It's old light, and there's not much of
 
it. But it's enough to see by. (445)
 
The final lines of both Cat's Eye and The Handmaid's Tale
 
reinforce Atwood's view that developing "night visiorj"—the
 
ability to see in the dark as well as in the light artd to
 
see a source of light where there appears to be only
 
darkness—is of utmost importance in itiaking sense of both
 
the characters' selves and the worlds of the novels ithin
 
which they exist, as well as making sense of our selves and
 
the world within which we exist.
 
Like many of Atwopd's other protagonists. Offred learns
 
to see as well in the darkness as in tae light and to
 
75
 
 appreciate any source of light, particularly the source , ■ 
which comes from within herself. In Gilead, Offred had to
 
learn to see in both; as indicated by the structure of the
 
novel, she spent most of her time in both 1itera1 and
 
figurative darkness. Structurally, the novel is div|ided
 
into fifteen sections, eight of which are entitled [Tight,"
 
a structure which highlights a repetitipus and Cpnti;Cluing
 
darkness punctuated by flickers of light. Throughoi;. the
 
novel, Offred makes her way through the literal and
 
figurative darkness of Gilead—a spiritual, psychological,
 
and intellectual darkness—and in the process develops a
 
strong sense of "night" vision. It m.ay be that one of the
 
purposes of her narrative is to enable her imagined 3
.istener
 
and future readers of the text to develop this same si ense of
 
night vision; to enable them (us) to •read" both her culture
 
and their own culture in the manner w:liiCh she has "read" and
 
written the "text" of Gilead.
 
In her quest to see clearly in both the darknes$ and
 
the light, Offred has relied on the power of language to
 
write the space between dichotomies and contrasts to
 
reconstruct her self. In highlightinc the cohtrast of light
 
and dark at the conclusion of the narrative, Atwood eems to
 
suggest that even the terms themselves are ambiguous. Even
 
■ j 
those things which seem most clear—the most we11^1iO
—may
 
be the ones that are the most dark. This point was j
 
illustrated in Offred's narrative: those in power, ti
hose
 
76
 
who thought they saw the world most (Clearly and att<i!mpted to
 
structure a society which would act as a "light" to|the rest
 
of the world, clearly were swallowed up in the darkness of
 
their power. Instead of constructing a source of light, the
 
powerful in Gilead created a psycholpgical, spiritual and
 
intellectual void of darkness.
 
But Offred learned to see in and make her way through
 
the darkness. She tried to make sensse of it, tellirig of it
 
through her narrative, and reconstructing her experiences
 
through language. However, she soon discovered that!
 
language has a paradoxical power all its own: like the
 
light/dark dichotomy, it has the pow^:r both to liberate and
 
to confine. Offred was confined when language was"used
 
against her" through the acts of labeling or when its use
 
was restricted by the powerful in Gilead. But she ajIso
 
found that even within the intellectual darkness of Silead,
 
language offered her the opportunity for freedom and for
 
reconstruction.
 
Instead of focusing only on the dark and impris3ning
 
qualities of language. Offred learns that freedom isj
 
possible, even within the confines of Gilead, even w Lthin
 
the confines of language. She experiences a sense o
 
freedom through telling her story. In the telling, she
 
reconstructs not only her self but also reconstructs events,
 
showing, in effect, that within every text there are "gaps"
 
Which offer alternatives and possibilities. Even wi::hin the
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 rigid and repressive system of Gilead, there are
 
opportunities to recreate and re-invesnt. There is t:he power
 
for change, for reconstruction. Becc.use she identifies the
 
power that exists within the narrati\e, through telling her
 
story. Offred realizes that she is not powerless after all.
 
she has the power to reconstruct her self and her story
 
through the telling of it, and though she could seizie upon
 
this power and fabricate any part of the narrative for any
 
purpose, she continually struggles against fabricating her
 
story. Instead, aware that what she offers is a
 
reconstruction, she identifies the ambiguity involved in
 
telling any story and enables us to see how language can be
 
both clarifying and distorting. In her narrative, she
 
strives to provide the reader with as complete and fully
 
contextualized account of her experiences in Gilead s
a
 
possible, to enable us to see the ambiguity arid to become
 
aware of the many possibilities that reconstructions offer.
 
One of the first times Offred re onstructs events is
 
after the Commander asks her to kiss !lim. She tells that
 
she thought about stabbing him with t:le sharp end of|a
 
toilet lever, how she would feel "the blood coming out of
 
him, hot as soup, sexual, over [her] 1lands" (181).
 
immediately, though, she admits that she really didn t
 
consider killing him at the time, that she only "put it in
 
afterwards" (181). Because she understands the poweji of
 
language to reconstruct both selves ai|id events, to c!:lange
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history so-to-speak, she understands that she can a<:d or
 
delete details as necessary to achie'v^e a speciiic pi:rpose.
 
Offred sees that language is not staliic, but rather that it
 
is malleable and fluid/ and with thisi realization shie
 
further realizes that she has the power tb change evients,
 
and even to change her life, through her reconstruGtion of
 
■It. 
Although language has given Offr[ed a s®hse of pipwer it 
is a power that she seems to fear as well as desireJ| She 
seems to be aware that there is something frightenirig about 
this power of language and reconstruction, similar to the 
fear identified by Michel Foucault as he "considers from the 
outside what might be strange, frightening, and perh'aps 
maleficent about discourse" ("The Order of Discoursej" 1155). 
This frightening component of discour£se is its ! 
■ : ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ 11 ^ 
■ . 'V' . .1 ■ ■ ■ ■ , . ■: ■ ■ I / . •: ­uncontrollability, an uncOntrollabililty which allows; for 
alternatives but also has the potentieal to create utter 
chaos. As Foucault states: 
It seems to me that beneath this apparent veneration of 
discourse, under ttiis apparent Icogophilia, a ce|rtain 
fear is hidden. It is just as ijf prohibitions, ; 
barriers, thresholds, and limits had been set u|) in 
■ \ . /, I ■ ' •' : / . ■ 
order to master, at least partly, the great j 
■ ■ ■ I ' ■ ■' ' • ■■■ ■ :'■ ■! ■- ' ■ ■! ■ : ^ ' 
• -^ ^ ■.■■ , ■ ■ ■ -I ■ ■ ■ ■ • ■ • ■- ■ ■ - I ■■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■■ ■■■ ■ .' .proliferation of discourse . . . I imagine in oiir 
society there is a profound logophobia, a sort bf mute 
terror against the surging up of all these statiaments. 
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against all that could be violent, discontinuous.
 
pugnacious, disorderly as well, and perilous about
 
theitt'—against this great incessant and disordei•ed
 
buzzing of discourse. (1164)
 
Similar to FOucault, Offred discover^ that the rulesi
 
governing language are imposed from the outside and can be
 
removed to reveal language's fluidity. But with this
 
discovery, she at once identifies iti^ freeing qualit:ies,
 
while at the same time she confronts the chaos and
 
discontinuity that that freedom entails, the very a pects of
 
language that terrify the powerful iiji Gilead. Offred
 
develops a love for words, but it is a love which cannot be
 
nurtured in an environment where logdphobia—-the fear of
 
words—reigns. Thereforef although sihe loVes words and
 
language because of the freedom inheij-ent in them, her love
 
of words is continually squelched by a regime which fears
 
the proliferation of meaning, who feUrs the "violent
 
discontinuous, pugnacious, and disorcierly" qualities of
 
language. Because of their fear of language, the pdwerful
 
in Gilead desperately strive to control it by impostng
 
prohibitions, barriers and thresholds in an effort to master
 
not only language, but also the people who use the language.
 
By enforcing these restrictions on lahguage, they '
 
simultaneously strive to enforce restrictidns on the growth
 
of human consciousness, and to turn subjects into objects.
 
symbols into signs, and consciousness into
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non-consciousness. It is no wonder 1:hat Offred desires
 
language; it offers her alternatiyesS to Gilead>
 
Although Offred loves the freeing qualities of
 
language, she also seems to fear the power which conjes
 
with choosing freedom through gaining access to uage.
 
As Foucault warns, "Discourse is not simply that whiCh
 
translates struggles or systsms of dcimination, but it is the
 
thing for which and by which there is struggle, dis ourse is
 
the power which is to be seized" (1155). This struggle is
 
evident throughout the novel; it is a struggle between the
 
powerful who strive to restrict discourse and the people who
 
I
 
strive to redefine theiriselves and neglotiate "reality"
 
through the exchange of discourse. Gilead vividly
 
i1lustrates Foucault's assertion that discourse is the
 
struggle, a struggle which is centered on the will or
;
 
power.
 
However, Offred rebels against tle will for power. She
 
has the opportunity to seize the power that language offers
 
her, but she resists. Her narrative affords her the
 
opportunity to tell and tecreath events iw any way that she
 
likes. Although she has the power to
 
reconstruct history through the telling of her tale, she
 
struggles against fabricating her stojry. Therefore, instead
 
of fabrication, she strives for authenticity, for a
 
reconstruction which centers on the confusion and ami:•iguity
 
which encircle events as they happen cind which is muJ tiplied
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in the retelling of those events. She does not ignore the
 
ambiguity; rather, she identifies it and works throT|igh it,
 
presenting scenes in all their complexity to her lisitener.
 
providing all the context that she possibly can
 
However, so difficult is the tassk of contextualizing
 
experience that Offred finds, at leasit twice, that 1t is
 
impossible to capture all that surrounds an experienlce, all
 
that the experience is embedded within. She realize;s that
 
what can truly be offered is only a reconstruction qf
 
events. Nothing can be retold (nor remembered) exadbly hOw
 
it occurred because the context within which it occurred can
 
never be fully recaptured. As Offred states, "A movie about
 
the past is not the same as the past" (306). The best one
 
can hope for is a reconstruction which is not the Trlth in
 
any absolute sense, but which, in Offred's words, "iiicludes
 
the truth" (344). When telling the s"::ory she is acutely
 
aware that it is a reconstruction because j
 
It's impossible to say a thing exactly the way it was,
 
because what you say can never be exact, you all(ays
 
have to leave something out; thei-e are tbo many parts,
 
sides, crosscurrents, nuances; too many gesture's, which
 
could mean this or that, too manj shapes which qan
 
never be fully described, too mary flavors, in the air
 
or on the tongue, haIf-colors, tco many. (174)
 
Like Offred herself, her story, as a reconstruction, resists
 
uniformity, correctness, and exactness Because the celling
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 of a story is not the same as living the story, thei:e will
 
always be something left out, somethj.ng not qapturec nor
 
fully explained. However, Offred is so completely qonscious
 
of the fact that context is of the ut:most importance in
 
interpretation that she fills in all that she possibly can
 
in the telling of the tale.
 
Because Offred is well aware Of the many ways tiat
 
context influences—some might even say "determines""—the
 
interpretation and/or reconstruction of experiences she
 
offers two different versions of her first rendezvoti!3 with
 
Nick. The first is a highly sensual account, centered
 
within the context of desire, passion, and a despera e need
 
for intimacy. And although it is a powerful and bellievable
 
reconstruction, Offred tells us that it really didn"i:happen
 
that way, and goes on to offer anothe^^ version, this time
 
centered in a less romantic context.
 
in the second version, Offred ta:ces into accouriil;
 
another level of the context Which suirrounds the experience.
 
It is the context of the "set up"; sh<i tells that Serena Joy
 
arranged the encounter because of her obsession to have a
 
child by any means. Because of this overriding context, the
 
second version is told with much less passion, and it: also
 
loses some of the sensuality and immediacy of the firSt.
 
Instead, in the second version. Offree, describes the
 
awkwardness and the disconnection whicb stem from the;
 
context which surrounds the experience—the acknowledgment
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 that both she and Nick have agreed to Serena Joy's cffer, an
 
acknowledgment which simultaneously suggests a lack of
 
power, choice, and autonomy. In this; context, both Offred
 
and Nick remain under Serena Joy's pc>wer and controi
 
Although the first version suggessts that thfey have both
 
regained some autonomy, choice, and sitatus as subjecits, the
 
second version undercuts the power of the first. Ini the
 
second version. Offred illustrates hew both she and Nick are
 
really still immersed in the sphere cf objectivity, Indeed,
 
the "corny and falsely gay sexual banter" whicjh they
 
: t
 
exchange in the second account reinfcrces the false and
 
stilted context within which the experience is embedled.
 
Offred herself states that the language acts as "an
 
acknowledgement, that we are acting, for what else dan we do
 
in such a setup?" (339). What else can they do in t!lis
 
context? Their choices seem to be either to ignore -he
 
context of the "setup" completely-—as Offred does in the
 
first account—or to acknowledge it and "play their ;Darts"
 
as sincerely as the context will allow. Through jux:aposing
 
these two distinctly different interpfetations of tho same
 
scene, Atwood illustrates just how crucia1 context is in the
 
interpretation (or reconstruction) of experience and|also in
 
the textual record of experience.
 
Although Offred does feel a sense of power throtigh the
 
ability to reconstruct events, she also realizes that being
 
conscious of the many ways that events can be interpieted.
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even within the moment in which they occur, can be
 
(paradoxically) both confusing and cJ.arifying. After she
 
offers both versions of her meeting vrith Nick, Offred
 
admits, "I'm not quite sure how it hcippened; not exactly.
 
All I can hope for is a reconstructiqn: the way leye feels
 
is always approximate" (340). Here, she seems to iniply that
 
experiences, like love, cannot be recaptured precise
 
because they defy the space/time bounidaries that we impose
 
on them. They can never be recaptured whole and intact
 
because they do not happen whole and intact. Experiances
 
are embedded within a context so complex that they
 
continually take new forms and shapes with each
 
reconstruction, with each retelling. They cannot be
 
reconstructed exactly because the subjject who recounts them
 
is embedded within the context which surrounds them.!
 
Through experiencing the moment, Offred becomes part of it.
 
She is not an objective observer who gathers and recc>rds
 
precise data for later distribution, Rather, she loses
 
herself in the experience (or perhaps relinquishes herself
 
to the experience), and therefore, becoming a part of the
 
context so integral to the recounting of experience, 'she is
 
always conscious of the fact that she can never relate,
 
exactly, what she has experienced. All is a reconstr'uction
 
embedded in and interwoven with the ccntext which is all.
 
Offred's efforts to fully contextualize her
 
surroundings, the tale, and her self give the text itj life
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force. It is a force which has its source in the cllii:isire for
 
freedom. Through her narrative, she strives not onll.y to
 
free her self, but also to free her text/ to allow:it the
 
possibility for multiple interpretations and
 
reconstructions. In doing so, she relinquishes the illusion
 
of authority implied by her authorial, stance, and st:
 
against "ownership" of the text or of future interpretations
 
of the text. Once again, she seems tio be
 
the will for power, and in doing so. seems to echo the words
 
of feminist writer and philosopher Hcslene Cixous who states,
 
"I set my sights high: I demand that love struggle within
 
the master against the will for power" ("A Woman Mistress"
 
1247). Love, then, becomes a way of against the
 
will for power in an attempt to promote an environment—or
 
text or language-—within which power and authority are
 
decentered and equalized. However, 1ove in this sense is
 
not the same as passion, nor is it the same as romantic or
 
sexua1 love, although it may be expressed in these forms of
 
love. Rather, Offred's love might be more clearly d(iifined
 
as the expression and actualization of generosity. jove, in
 
the form of generosity, enables her to give of her st If^-in
 
the form of energy, time, and commitment'-•-•to the text. It
 
is a love which drives her to contextualize her narrative as
 
fully as possible and to offer it the opportunity to find
 
its own expression as she creates it and at the same time
 
relinquishes the illusion of control over it. It is almost
 
86
 
as though she decides, like the writer depicted in Sartre's
 
"Why Write" that
 
[A writer's] decision to write ^ upposes that h«-i [or
 
she] withdraws somewhat from his; [or her] feelings, in
 
short, that he has transformed his emotions into free
 
emotions, as I do mine while reciding him; that is, that
 
he is in an attitude of generosity. (380)
 
As Sartre's passage isuggests, the writer who writes|with an
 
attitude of generosity expects the seme generosity from his
 
or her readers. It is a reciprocal relationship, ba'sed on
 
trust, wherein the writer relinguishes control of the text
 
in order that the text find its expression in the
 
interaction between reader and writer In this sen e,
 
neither the writer nor the reader seizes the will fO|r power;
 
neither one seizes control of the meaning-making endsavor.
 
Instead, both relinquish control and negotiate the mleaning
 
of the text. As Sartre goes on to sa
Y,
 
[R]eading is a pact of generosity between author and
 
reader. Each one trusts the other, each one co|ants on
 
the other, demands of the other as much as he [|>r she]
 
demands of himself [or herself]. (379)
 
This "pact of generosity," then, is not a form of
 
unconditional love, one wherein the w:riter makes no demands
 
on the reader. Rather, it is a love ]oased on reciprocity.
 
one wherein the writer demands the same generosity—in the
 
form of energy and commitment—from her reader that he
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 demands from herself. But, as Sartre notes, "Nothing can
 
force the author to believe that his reader will use his
 
freedom, [just as] nothing can force the reader to believe 
the author has used his. Both of them make a free decision" 
(380). Both reader and writer, then, have the freeilom to 
enter into a pact of generosity, but the freedom in lerent in 
this endeavor does not guarantee that either one wi.1 meet 
the demands of the other. A writer who writes in a 
of generosity, who trusts that his or her readers w 11 
reciprocate the love that is offered by demanding an much 
from themselves as they demand frOm the text, is truly in a 
precaridus position. A text created in a spirit of 
generpsity faces a vPry uncertain fui:ure, because not every 
reader will answer the demands place<i upon him or h€r by the 
text. Therefore, to write in a spirit of generosit almost 
demands that the writer take a Kierk«ig:aardian "leap of ■ ; 
faith"—a leap of faith in the reader's ability and or 
desire to reciprocate the generosity that the author has 
given, to put as much effort and commitment into reading the 
text as the author put into writing :.t. 
Because the writer can never de1:ermine if his or her
 
intent will be actualized in future ireadings of the text,
 
writing becomes an act of faith. Thei writer must have faith
 
that his or her readers will enter into the pact of
 
generosity and join in the writer's quest to make the world
 
meaningful. In this light, then, the; "demands" whihh Sartre
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 suggests that the reader arid writer have for one another
 
might be more clearly defined as "offers." The writ|er:>
 
writing from a context of generosity, extends to the reader
 
an offer to enter into the pact of generosity in hopss that
 
the reader will reciprocate with generosity—in terxs of the
 
expenditure of time, energy, and effoft—-when readin3 the
 
text. This reading, truly can never be demanded; it rests
 
on a concept of freedom which allows for multiple
 
interpretations and multiple recqnstr|Lictions. It is the
 
same freedom Offred strove for througrlout her impris anment
 
in Gilead, and it is the same freedom that she offers her
 
narrative.
 
Many readers, however, can not or will not enter into a
 
^ ■ ' ,' ■ ■ ' . ■■ " ■ ■■ ■ i'l 
pact of generosity. These readers will continue to imprison 
texts within their own ideological an<i contextual 
constructs. In the following chaptef' I will explore the 
ways in which the epilogue of The Handmaid's Tale, a 
seemingly disconnected section of the novel entitled 
"Historical Notes on THE HANDMAID'S TALE," illustrates the 
tendency of many readers to imprison texts within their own 
ideological constructs. Chapter 4 will also explore the 
dangers that stem from overlooking oui- own preconcepi^ions 
and assumptions when reading and intei'pretingf texts arid how 
this tendency to overlook our own "contextual constructs" 
might further stifle the proliferation of meaning, i!s 
Atwood vividly demonstrates in the epilogue, every re 
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is a reconstruction of the original text. Therefore once
 
an author relinquishes control of the text and placeis it
 
into the hands of future readers, the text's future is
 
filled with uncertainty. But this uncertainty is essential
 
for any text which represents the human quest for freedom;
 
it is based on the trust a writer has in his or her ieaders
 
that the meaning-making endeavor will continue regarq less of
 
the contextual constraints—the assumptions and
 
preconceptions—that the reader brings to the text, It is a
 
trust that is essential in any effort to "connect" aiid
 
commune with others, and it is a trust; that helps us|
 
navigate through uncertainty and ambiguity in an effc?rt to
 
negotiate a hew—and preferably impro\'^ed~"reality."
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CHAPTER 4
 
CONTEXTUAL CONSTRUCTS AND CONSTRAINTS
 
If we cease to judge this world, we ittay find ou:i selves,
r
 
very gUickly, in one which is in initely worse,
 
garet Atwood, "'VPitches"
 
Although At^oddqonsistently demionstrates that context
 
is all" throughout the novel-—both th:irough offering
 
reconstructions and through providihg as much contex t;as.: 

possible within the text-^her strorigekt statement rec;arding
 
the importance of context is not foun within Offred s
 
narrative. Instead, it is found in what surrounds tlrle
 
central text. It is found in the statement Atwood makes by
 
centerihg Offred's harrative within ah historical context,
 
the context of the past which precedes it and the futbure
 
which awaits it. Both the novel•s ded
ication and it
 
epilogue, which frame the central text of Offred•s
 
experience, serve tb illustrate how context affects nlot only
 
the creation of a tbxtv bht furthefTOb e^, how it affects
 
future interpretations of that text.
 
The dedication serves to show th€! relationship between
 
"real life" and fiction. By juxtaposing the "real 11fe"
 
experiences of Mary Webster and Perry Miller with the
 
fictional experiences of Offred and Professor Pieixoto (in
 
the epilogue) Atwood questions the distinction often
 
associated with the words ''real life" and fiction. Instead
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V 
 of showing these entities as contrasts, Atwood merges "real
 
life" experience and fictional experience to show that the
 
boundary between them is not as clear nor as rigidly defined
 
as some would like to believe. This Chapter exp1ore3 the
 
ways that Atwood once again "writes the space betweei" yet
 
another dichotomy, the dichotomy of "fact" and fictian.
 
One of the people to whom Atwood dedicates the :lovel is
 
Mary Webster. Webster was one of Margaret Atwood's
 
ancestors who lived during Puritan ti:mes—a Puritanii3m
 
loudly echoed within Atwood'sGilead-
-who was tried md
 
hanged as a witch. Amazingly, though, Webster survi^^ed the
 
hanging and lived to tell about it. In her essay "W
-tches,"
 
Atwood tells that Webster (who she st^ tes is her "fa'rourite
 
ancestor") survived the hanging becau^e "they had not
 
invented the drop; in those days, th^y just sort of strung
 
you up" (331). On many levels, Webster's expefience is
 
hauntingly similar to Offred's: both women lived in
 
oppressive, radically fundamentalisti<^ times and botli faced
 
a death sentence for their "crimes agginst the state
 
However, on another level the similarities are not a
 
apparent. Although the historical re<i:ord indicates r.hat
 
Mary Webster escaped imminent death b€5cause, as Atwoc
 
states, "she had a strong neck" ("Witcb:hes" 331), Atwcod does
 
not offer us the same certainty conceirning Offred's escape
 
from Gilead nor her subsequent survivicll Although it
 
possible that Offred was rescued by Nick and the Maycay
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Underground, it is also possible that she was lead tD her 
, '. ' .A ■ ^ 
death by Nick, the man she trusted, whose final word 3 to her 
were, ironica1ly, "Trust me" (377). If we trust Nicc, if we 
believe that he was only pretending to hand Offred p /er to 
the authorities, then it is possible to believe that: Of fr^pd 
escaped the walls of Gilead and survived. However, If we do 
not trust Nick, if we believe that he was actually o:le of 
the "Eyes" who pretended to love Offrsd, but instead abused 
her trust and turned her over to the authorities, th( jn it is 
possible to believe that Offred never escaped nor su:rvived 
Gilead. On this point, Atwood remain;3 ambiguous. Biit even 
if Offred did not physically survive Gilead, an impo;rtant 
part of her did surviye. What survivi■3d Gilead in ei :her 
case is the text of Offred's life and her journey th 
the darkness of Gilead. Like Mary Webster who left 1;he 
story of her life for future generati n^s, Offred lea ^ es for 
us the text of her life, a text which becomes the foi al 
point for future "historians" who may then use it as "data" 
in their quest to reconstruct the pas: and assemble I:he 
textual record of history. 
One of these real life historians is Perry Miller, 
another to whom the novel is dedicated, who was an historian 
and Professor of American Literature dt Harvard University 
when Atwood studied there. Miller wa , as critic Harriet 
Bergmann notes, "a scholar of Mary Webster•s repressive and 
religion-dominated society, just as Jd:mes Darcy Pieixoto, 
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 the academic who reads a paper on Offred's tale in ttie
 
epilogue, is of Offred's" (college Enalish 851). In
 
dedicating the novel both to the woman who lived to tell her
 
story (Webster) and the man who retold—and reconstructed-­
her stoty two hundred years later (Miller), Atwood pjrovides
 
an example froiji the real world which questions the "
 
of history that is passed down to futUre generations This
 
question, then, becomes one of the importance of context in
 
any interpretive endeavor, and a warning to all who
 
"decontextualize," decpnstruct, or minimize both peopie and
 
texts>
 
In the epilogue, we leave the unfamiliarity of lilead
 
and are transported two hundred years into the future, to
 
the year 2195, which, ironically, is;
 seemingly more |fami1iar
 
than the more recent "future" of Gilead. In the epilogue,
 
we are presented with "a partial transcript of the
 
proceedings of the Twelfth Symposium on Gileadean Studies."
 
The keynote speaker at the symposium is Professor James
 
barcy Pieixoto, an historian who delivers a paper en itled
 
"Problems of Authentication in Referenee to The Hand]naid's
 
Tale." Through Pieixoto, Atwood brilLiantly satirizes those
 
who, like perry Miller at Harvard and the Commander in
 
Gilead, are in a particularly powerful position: those who
 
have the power to interpret texts and whose interpre rations
 
are often sanctioned by the power stractures which tlese i-'''' ­
people help create. Atwood seems to suggest that, in very
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dangerous ways, the interpretations and reconstructions
 
offered by those in power—whether in the academy or in the
 
political realm—often act to rigidify texts and limit other
 
possible interpretations of those texts. In Gilead, those
 
in power imposed a single interpretation on Biblical texts
 
which Constrained not only the texts, but also the people
 
within the walls of Gilead. Likewise, in the epilogue,
 
Professor Pieixoto hands down a single interpretation of
 
Offred•s text which constrains her and limits future
 
interpretations of her text. Atwood s understated yet .
 
scrupulous use of irony in the epilog!ue acts to reinforce
 
her assertion that "context is all" in any interpretive
 
endeavor, whether it be an historical document, a fictional
 
text, or the world as "text."
 
Atwood sets the epilogue at the fictional University of
 
Denay, Nunavit, which is phonetically translated to "'
 
None of it." Besides serving as a satirical commentary oh
 
the nature of academic conferences, the environment
 
in Denay also serves to illustrate the firm hold that
 
hierarchical power structures and paradigms have on the
 
collective consciousness of both moderri and "native"
 
cultures. As commentator Arnold Davidson has suggested,
 
Denay may represent the future nation that a number of
 
native people in Canada—particularly those of Inuit
 
ancestry—wish to form in the north, Davidson suggests that
 
this nation would be one in which "the traditional ways Of
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 the natives [would] replace the Western ways of thei
 
oppressors" (119). However, as the epilogue shows, although
 
the native people—if names are any indicatiqn—have indeed
 
formed their own nation, they have not overturned thi2 system
 
which oppresses them. Rather, hierarchical power Structures
 
seem to have remained intact, and as Davidson suggesjits, so
 
do the institutions that embody them (119).
 
On a surface level, the environmlent Atwopd crea:es in
 
the epilogue seems to be much more civilized and egalLitarian
 
than the Gileadean environment. In this future nation,
 
women have once again achieved "equality," as iliustiirated by
 
the fact that a woman. Professor Maryann CresGent Moon,
 
chairs the convention. However, at a deeper level, Atwood
 
seems to suggest that the "equality" attained in this:5 future
 
society may be suspect, and furthermore, that we miglit do
 
well to look more closely at what we term "equality" in our
 
own culture. For instance, despite Professor Cresceiit
 
Moon's rise in status in the academic community, her duties
 
as chair seem to parallel those of a social chairperson:
 
she organizes nature walks, fishing expeditions, and
 
sing-songs, and she seems to be more concerned with
 
extracurricular activities than with cicademic concerriis, as
 
seen in her reminder to Professor Pied.xoto to "keep within
 
his time period . . . [because] none cjif us wants to miss
 
lunch, as happened yesterday" (380).
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 Although women have regained soine status and power in
 
this society, it may be—as Offred realized her own sense of
 
power was in Gilead-^"of an equivocal kind" (272). For
 
example, after informing the audience of all the chaages in
 
the social calendar. Crescent Moon turns the floor ov^er to
 
Professor Pieixoto who immediately sets out to relegate
 
women—in particular Professor Crescent Moon and Offred—to
 
the margins of the discourse. He begins his "little chat"
 
with a derogatory and demeaning reference to Professar
 
Crescent Moon, referring to her as the "charming Arctic
 
Chair" which he is sure the audience is"enjoying" as much
 
as they enjoyed the previous night's "charming Arcti3 Char."
 
Of course, the word arctic in this sease could refer to what
 
is most likely Crescent Moon's inuit ethnicity—-in wiich
 
case the pun seems to be a racial slur—but the word also
 
elicits sexist connotations of "cold" and "frigid." And
 
lest the audience miss the sexist con:iiotationiS of hi 5
 
remark, Pieixoto is quick to point ou:that he is using "the
 
word 'enjoy' in two distinct senses, iprecluding the obsolete
 
third" (381), an attempt at humor whi h^ has, at its center,
 
the humiliation and degradation of wo:men.
 
Professor Pieixoto continues to irrivialize women and
 
their experiences by making them the butts" of his jokes, a
 
strategy whereby he gains the illusioili of power over them,
 
Further attempts at huinor at the expense of women occur in
 
his reference to the Underground Femai eroad as the
 
"Underground Frailroad" (381) and hiss insistence on pointing
 
out the "pun" in the title of Offred s narrative,
 
"particularly that having to do with the archaic vulgar
 
signification of the word tail, that being, to some extent,
 
the bone, as it were, of contention in that phase o
 
Gileadean society of which our saga treats" (381). By
 
belittling women and their experiencsis, Professor Pi.eixoto
 
strives to center himself within the discussion, th«Sreby
 
maintaining power and control over tllie "Subject" uncil
er
 
discussion. Of course, since this sgciety is set up as a
 
contrast to Gilead, and also speaks i much more familiar
 
language (familiar, especially, to any academic who has sat
 
through a similar "fascinating and worthwhile talk"), these
 
lines are rather clever, but the laughter (or chuckles or
 
even groans) they elicit may be an indication that this
 
society has not advanced all that much, nor learned very
 
much, from Offred•s account of Gilead. AtWoOd may be
 
suggesting that in contrast to Gilead, Denay appears to be
 
more "well-lit," but in relation to the light that OJffred
 
reads by, it is still immersed in dajjrkness. Likewise, in
 
contrast to Gilead, the environment in Denay is much more
 
familiar to us, but it is a familiarity that may blind us to
 
the continued use of language to devalue women and their
 
experiences
 
Particularly relevant in terms <j)f the devaluatlve power
 
of language is Pieixoto's consistent Use of the words "item"
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and 'Vdocument" in reference to Offred's story. Both' of
 
these terms act to"objectify" and tfivialize the narrative
 
—and the harratbr-'-in very dangerous ways. During his
 
discussion, Pieixoto reveals that he and his colleague^
 
Professor Wade, discovered and transcjribed "some thi;rty tape
 
Cassettes" which contained Offred's criginal, spoken
 
narrative. Besides transcribing her words, they al o found
 
that they had to "arrange the blocks of speech in the order
 
which they appeared to go" (383). And while he doe admit
 
that this "arrangement" is based on cfuesswork and is to be
 
regarded as "approximate," he does not treat the final
 
text—the final construct—as an approximation. Rattier, he
 
continues to appropriate the text and. refuses to negotiate
 
its meaning. Instead of entering int;o a pact of generosity
 
with Offred, Pieixoto rewrites and rednterprets Offred's
 
words and diminishes her presence in the text.
 
Although Offred was well aware, even at the moment she
 
was telling her story, that whatever form her narrative took
 
after its conception, "it [would] be a reconstructicin too,
 
at yet another remove" (173), she still may not have been
 
prepared for the countless removes thtat occur before? it
 
reaches its final form, those removes Caused by the passage
 
of time and the misreadings of "historians." Nevertheless,
 
Offred's efforts to contextualize hei- life in Gileac and her
 
process of rebelling against uniformj.ty and correctriess in
 
reconstructing her self remain within the text. Offred
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 provides all the context that she posisibly can in ari effort
 
to help her "listener" see in and through the darkneiss of
 
Gilead.
 
However, instead of paying atteijition to the coritext
 
which Offred strove so painstakingly to provide, Pieixoto
 
ignores the context of her narrative-^-all the flavois.
 
colors, gestures, crosscurrents—-and in the process
 
decontextualizes Offred in much the same way that the
 
powerful in Gilead decontextualized her upon her imijiersion
 
into Gilead. Through his reconstruc"^ion, he erases her from
 
the text in much the same way as she tells that she was
 
erased from her daughter's life by tlie Gileadeans. Echoing
 
through the text are Offred's feelings about being f.rased
 
from the text of her daughter's life, and by extensjon, the
 
text of her own life:
 
Time has not stood still. It his washed over Ae,
 
washed me away, as if I'm a wom^n made of sand .1
 
have been obliterated for her. .I am only a shadow
 
now. . .A shadow of a shadow. I am not there. (296)
 
As Atwood demonstrated throughout the novel, throug 1 force
 
and might, the Gileadean government tfas able to
 
decontextualize Offred and remove her from the histpry of
 
her daughter's life. But in the epilogue, Atwood si:lows that
 
it would be left for future historiafis to decontextiialize
 
Offred once again by removing her from her bwri text the
 
only record of the self she had becokie. Ironically
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hoWeyer, Offred predicted that she would be erased i rom
 
history even while she was in the process of composing her
 
self through her narrative. She sta:es, "Frpin the |)dint of
 
view of future history . . . we'll be invisible'' (215). It
 
is a point that Pieixoto does not dispute—or perhaps does
 
not see—but in the text, Offred tells exactly how 4he feels
 
about being deconstructed not once, l5ut twice: "I can't
 
bear it, to have been erased like that" (296). Pieixoto,
 
obviously unaware of the contextual constraints thai,
 
influence his interpretation, overlooks these remarks and
 
most of the context that Offred provides in her narrative.
 
Besides overlooking the context that Offred provides,
 
Professor Pieixoto also overlooks what appears to have been
 
one of Offred's main concerns: the Importance of hi
ir name.
 
Throughout the novel, Offred states that she has "h.jiLdden her
 
name, like a buried treasure" (108), a treasure whic:h she
 
does not give away freely, but offer3 only to those she can
 
trust. In the novel, the only person she entrusted her name
 
to was Nick. However, she also entrusts it to us, if we are
 
able to see it. At the beginning of her story, Offired lists
 
five names: Alma, Janine, Delores, Moira, and June In the
 
course of the narrative, each of these names is accbunted
 
for, except for the last name, June It is quite possible
 
that this is Offred's name, although possibly not her "real"
 
name. During his presentation. Professor Pieixoto Informs
 
us that the other names were used as protective pseudonyms,
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and quite probably, the name June is no exception. But
 
because Offred knows that a name conveys a sense of
 
identity, it is likely that she would choose the nare "June"
 
because of the many connotations which derive from the
 
single word, connotations which migh^ convey her owr
 
of self. Offred may have chosen the name June because it
 
; ■ 11 ■ 
suggests a source of light: June is the time of year when 
there is more light than darkness, w:lich may sugges": that 
through her narrative she offers us k source of light by 
which to read the Gileadean culture and also our own 
culture. In fact, Offred herself as lociates her name with 
images of light. She says, 
[My] name has an aura around it, like an amule) some
 
charm that's survived from an unimaginably distant past
 
. . . my name floats there behind my eyes, no- quite
 
within reach, shining in the dark. (108)
 
Offred's name has survived from the past—both her ^ wn past
 
and the "future past" which separates her from Pieixoto—and
 
it remains within the text/ shining in the dark, for those
 
who can see it. The name June, then, acts to reinforce one
 
of Atwood's Strongest points, specifically, striking a
 
1 sense
 
balance between dichotomies, particularly between dl
arkness
 
and light. By offering us her name, Offred simultkne^ously
 
■ ■ . , i 
offers us a source of light with which to balance the 
darkness of Gilead, and also the dai'kness which suirounds us
 
in our own world. To miss the context of balance 1:;etween
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 darkness and light is to miss what aTO to be AtTi^ood's
 
strongest point: in making sense of the written tOJkct and
 
the "world as text," we must be able to "see" in the
 
, 1
 
darkness as well as the light. Like Offred, we must develop
 
night vision.
 
professor Pieixoto, however, rejtaains night bliiid and
 
misses most of the context that Offred provides in ler
 
narrative. Instead of finding clarification, then. the
 
narrative continues to puzzle him, and he laments tlat
 
[T]he past is a great darkness. and filled wit1 echoes,
 
Voices may reach us from it; but what they say to us is
 
imbued with the obscurity of the matrix out of which
 
they come; and try as we may, we cannot alway decipher
 
them precisely in the clearer ight of our own
 
(395)
 
Pieixoto, convinced that the "light" of his own day is much
 
better to "read" history by, fails t:o recognize thcit we can
 
only understand and make sense of Gd.lead, of oppre sion and
 
horror, if we iinmerse ourselves witl^in the heart of darkness
 
from which these atrocities emerge, Only if we caii identify
 
the darkness itself, and then learn to see in and t:hrough
 
the darkness—becoming as acutely aware of the shadows as
 
well as the well-lit images—can we learn from the past and
 
see into the present darkness which continues to surround
 
us.
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 Unfortunately, Pieixoto is unab;Le--or possibly
 
unwilling—to see all the context that Offred provides
 
within the text, mainly because his <3oncerns are not the
 
same as Offred's concerns. Offred is concerned with showing
 
■ ■ . " • • ■ ■ ' , ■ • ■ ' ■ ■■ '' ■ ' i l ' 
■ ■ ■. ■ / ■ ■ ■ . ■ ■ ■ ■ i'! ■ •the human element of the text; Pieixpto is concerned mainly 
with authehticating her story and specifically with 
establishing the Commander's true idsentity. In fac't, most 
of the paper he reads at the symposit im focuses on tl|iese two 
points. In his paper, he reveals theat he has narroj//ed the 
historical evidence to two "brilliant , ingenious gentlemen" 
—Watserford and Judd—one of whom is most probably ithe 
"real" Commander. His main regret iss that Offred did not 
have the "instincts of a reporter or a Spy" because] if she 
had. She could have then gathered ai;1 the "evidence!" that he 
so desperately wants. As he states, "What would W6| not 
give, now, for even twenty pages or so of print-out from 
waterford's private computer!" (393) Pieixoto is jhot 
concerned with the human element-*ti:i<e subject--of tJhe text; 
rather he is concerned with gathering hard evidence' 
—objects-'-from the regime; and in t;his quest he cointinues 
to margirialize Offred and her experiences through 
appropriating her text. 
While Pleixoto diligently searcthes historical |records 
and doctimentS for clues about the Commander's identpity, he 
overlooks—and in effect, silences—the voice whiclf calls 
out from the text. But, as Offred cnows, he cannc silence 
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her completely; she knows that "[w]hatever is silencbed will
 
clamour to be heard, though silently" (196). We aret left
 
then, with the voice of a woman who l|ias struggled within and
 
finally survived Gilead. Her story is a story of
 
survivalism.
 
Survivalism may not be as "weig:ity" as Pieixotp's
 
concern to collect "hard data" which would once-and-for-all
 
establish the authenticity of the tapes, but it is xtremely
 
important in understanding Offred's message and by
 
implication, Atwood's message. In her essay
 
"Canadian-American Relations," Atwood defines the p;
 
of survivalism:
 
Survivalism, of course, is not the same as tiragedy or
 
existential despair or even pessimism about the human
 
condition. It's being stuck ir a blizzard with one
 
match; a kind of minimalism, fine, but if you get that
 
fire lit it's a triumphant event, considering the odds.
 
(387)
 
Offred's text has survived the atrocpities of Gileae The
 
existence of the tapes—and Pieixoto's subsequent
 
transcription and reconstruction of them into text -affirms
 
her survival and her existence. It is an existence that is
 
trivialized by Pieixoto, but One th^t continues thi•oughout
 
time for readers who are able to see it. Although Pieixoto
 
strives to force Offred back to "the blank white spaces at
 
the edges of print . . . in the gap between the si:ories'
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(74), her narrative resists the bounGaries that his [
 
interpretation forces upon it. Offr4d has written and
 
filled in the spaces between and her voice demands to be
 
heard.
 
Only those who refuse to read wtiat she has writ:ten
 
within the context she provides, pnlv those who insist on
 
erasing her from history, will contiiiue to lament w;th
 
PieixotO that "many gaps remain" (393) within the text.
 
Indeed, many gaps will remain in any text, particulsrly
 
those texts which resist the boundaries—hence
 
interpretations—•that future readeris influenced by their
 
own social, political, and psych61og;Lcal cohtexts, impose on
 
them. But a voice will survive within the text/ ev4n though
 
it remains uncertain how that voice will be "heard.
 
Offred knows that by relinquishIng the illusioh of
 
power and authority over her text she offers the narrative
 
the same possibilities for freedom that she herself wanted
 
within Gilead. She also knows that she cannot dete:rmine how
 
the text will be read by future readers. No matter how much
 
context she provides, the text will be framed by the history
 
that preceded it and the future that awaits it. It will be
 
read not only within the context she provides, but also
 
within the contextual and ideologica1 constructs of her
 
future readers. Centered between the past and the future.
 
the text's future is as uncertain as Offred's future was at
 
the end of the novel. At the end of her narrative Offred
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 finds herself "between two [stranger5], one on eithjsr side"
 
(378), who lead her toward an uncert
ain future. Li)jcewise,
 
after she relinquishes control of her text, it also finds
 
itself centered between two "strangers," the strangers of
 
the past and the future. And like Offred, who has •given
 
herself over into the hands of strangers, because it can't
 
be helped" (378), so too her narrative must be given over
 
into the hands of strangers—^like Pieixoto and Wade, but
 
also like us—-whose readings will finally determine the
 
meaning of the text.
 
But if we learn to read as Offrfed has, by balancing the
 
darkness and the light, by choosing to enter into a pact of
 
generosity with her, the text will ejnswer many of o
ur
 
questions. With each reconstruction and reinterprej:tation,
 
Offred's voice, which silently clamors within the text,
 
continues to provide the context essiential for
 
interpretation. Even so, she seems to be aware that in any
 
interpretive endeavor, there will always be questiqns, and
 
in a sense, she predicts Professor Pieixoto's fina
 
possibly rhetorical--question, "Are there any ques ions?"
 
By closing the novel with this finaiL, enigmatic line, Atwood
 
seems to suggest that there will al\mys be questioris with no
 
simple answers, or whose answers reipain in the dar}:ness
 
which Continues to threaten the ligtit.
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 CONCLUSION
 
If language is as old as conscicjusness itself, j|and if
 
language is a practical consciousness-for-othefs arid,
 
consequently, consciousness-forjmyself, then rufjt only
 
one particular thought but all cohsciousness is
 
connected with the development of the word . . ; The
 
word is a direct expression of the historical nature of
 
human consciousness.
 
Lev VygotskV, Thought and Lanauaae
 
As presented in the Introduction, Whorf's hypothesis of
 
linguistic determinism suggests that there are many ways
 
that language appears to determine an individual's jif/orId
 
view. Of utmost importance is the way that language, as a
 
vast pattern system, aids in the ereation of cognitive
 
schemes which enable us to gain knowledge about ourselves
 
and the world and in the process, aid in the construction of
 
our consciousnesses. Because language is so closely linked
 
to thought processes, if it is regarded as static, if
 
symbolic meaning is stifled, then th[e formation of cognitive
 
schemes will be adversely affected, Placing restrictionS on
 
language and/or limiting the creatid:n of meaning resuits in
 
a simultaneous restriction in the gijowth of knowledge and of
 
consciousness.
 
Margaret Atwood vividly illusti'ated this restj
ictive
 
meaning^making environment throughout Offred's narii'ative and
 
possibly even more importantly, in the epilogue wh:lch
 
follows the narrative. However, although Atwood highlights
 
^ ! , • . ■ ■ ■ ■ ' [
and explores the fundamental canacitv of language io govern 
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our world view, I do not believe that she completely adopts 
a Whorfian philbsdphy of linguistic determinismV 
through Offred's narrative, she shows that there are ways to 
rebel against and even brahscend lin<juistic deterininisro. Tb 
accomplish this goal, however, people must first id<;»ntify 
the ways that language can be "used against" them: through 
the linguistic acts of labeling, thr3ugh restricting 
language to certain segments of socisty, and through 
■ , V ■ ' ' ; ^ ■ i . ■ ■ ■■ ■ ■ '■ 
sanctioning single interpretations of any "text," whether 
spoken, written or experienced. 
Once aware of the many ways that language may constrain 
our thought processes, we can find ways to rebel against 
becoming victims of language. Instead of believinglj that 
language only reflects "reality," we can empower oi rselves 
by perceiving language as a powerful means to create new 
realities. We do not have to regard as final the 
provisional analysis of the external or internal world that 
is formulated through our language. Through linguistic 
awareness, we might, instead, avail ourselves of the many 
possibilities offered by language. If we can identify in 
language the potential for determinism, we can rebb1 against 
those aspects of language which may constrain our ability to 
freely process information and construct alternative 
realities. 
In The Handmaid's Tale. Atwood presented us with a 
• ji ■ . 
. ■ ■ ■ ■ f- ■ ' ■ ' ■world so alien that it was readily apparent how language was 
109 
used to subjugate and oppress the citizens of Gileaci But
 
ren
as Whorf suggests, looking at different cuitures--e'j
 
fictional cultures—may be one way tp gain a clearer
 
perspective of our own culture. Ratler than seeing only the
 
foreign and alien aspects of diverse
 culturesj we in|Lght gain
 
more insight into our own culture by seeing the simiLlarities
 
between cultures. It has been argued that the atrocities
 
that occur in Gilead could never occur in the "real world."
 
However, as Atwood has stated in an interview with i^athy
 
Davidson, everything that happens in the novel is "true" and
 
has, in some form, happened in the "real world" (inj Arnold
 
Davidson 115). Although the atrocities which occur through
 
language abuse may be more apparent in the Gileadean world
 
than they are in our own, we need orly look at the way that
 
Professor Pieixoto, in the epilogue. uses language to assert
 
his power while he simultaneously diminishes the pciwer of
 
others to see how language abuse is a reality in our
 
world" as well.
 
If the environment in the epilbgue can serve as a model
 
of our own society, then identifying the ways that.
 
Pieixoto's discourse mirrors our own may offer projround
 
insight into the ways that we are oiJpressed—or the ways
 
that we oppress others-^through the use of language.
 
Therefore, by identifying the ways in which langucige might
 
limit our world view, especially on a subconscious level, we
 
can become more sensitive to the political contexts of
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 language which act to subjugate and oppress people iin our
 
own culture. By learning to "read" c>ur culture as c|ffred
 
read hers—through developing a keen awareness of aj^id 
. . . ■ , i 
sensitivity to language—we might, like her, tap into the
 
many possibilities offered by languacje and reconstruct not
 
only our internal worlds, but reconstruct our external world
 
as well.
 
Ill
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